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comparison to both the 20's and the 30's, the 1940's were years of 
industrial upheaval. The number of workers on strike in South Africa in 
any given year increased from 730 in 1940 to 84 035 in 1946 (2). The 
Witbank Collieries were no exception to this trend of increased 
industrial disputes and well over 33 strikes were recorded as occurring 
on the collieries between 1940 and 1950. 
While strike action intensified on the collieries, the form that the 
strikes took did not differ much from their predecessors. As was the 
case in the 1920's, the strikes tended to focus narrowly on immediate 
issues pertaining to specific conditions on a particular mine. The 
strikes were shortlived, seldom lasting more than one or two days. The 
number of workers involved in the strike action varied depending on the 
size of the mine. Despite the shortlived and local character of these 
strikes, they disrupted production schedules and were important enough 
to receive the attention of the police force and Native Affairs 
Inspectors in Witbank. Testimony of this are the reports written by 
these people and filed in the Native Affairs Department (3). 
Furthermore, although the strike issues pertained to specific conditions 
on particular mines, they must be seen in terms of a wider context of 
industrial action on the collieries. During this period, expressions of 
worker dissatisfaction and strike action on the various collieries 
reveal certain common characteristics and recurrent patterns. 
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B) THE MORAL ECONOMY OF THE MINES 
During the the 1940's there were still no formal contracts mediating 
labour relations or prescribing the boundaries of managerial domination 
over the black workforce. Although the rise of the African Mineworkers 
Union had begun to influence labour relations on the gold mines in this 
period, union issues did not penetrate the coal mines in any 
distinguishable way. However, the fact that there were a clear set of 
common issues leitmotifs which served as catalysts for the 
disturbances across all mines, suggests that some type of informal 
contract had been established between workers and management, 
particularly circumscribing the actions of the latter. Dunbar Moodie 
employed the concept of a "moral economy" to refer to this informal 
contract that was established on the mines, a contract which was both 
elusive and stood outside formal structures of control. While Moodie 
used the concept of the moral economy as an analytical tool to 
specifically describe the nature of resistance on the goldmines in the 
40's, the concept can be extrapolated from that context and can be 
likewise seen as a relevant and appropriate tool of analysis for 
resistance on the coal mines during the same period. 
In Moodie's words, the notion of a moral economy is 'a means of 
capturing the essential features of resistance and accommodation'(4) 
amongst the industrial workforce on the mines. The mechanisms of social 
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control underpinning the mine hierarchy and the compound system were 
explicit and manifest; they imposed a framework of control on the 
workforce that unequivocally circumscribed potential areas of worker 
action. Compounds, typologised by Foucault as "carceral and 
disciplinary" institutions, or by Sitas as a "formula for domination", 
(5administered the workers lives during work and rest hours. However, 
alongside this explicitly repressive form of control "from above", there 
existed an informal and implicit contract between workers and mine 
management. Moodie perceives the nature of this contract as a moral one. 
He sees it as encapsulating certain minimum expectations that black mine 
workers held of the official managerial hierarchy - that tight- knit 
coordinate of Indunas, police boys and white compound and underground 
staff . 
The notion of a moral economy suggests that the workers exercised a 
degree of leverage in influencing certain conditions on the mines, both 
within the spheres of production and reproduction. Moodie draws a useful 
distinction between the concepts of power and authority in an attempt to 
understand the nature and impact of the workers' influence on the mines. 
Authority implies that rules imposed by certain actors ... will be obeyed 
by ... themselves or others. Authority is exercised whether or not those 
who are dominated consent to the domination. (6; Power, on the other 
hand, is never institutionalised but operates on a personal level. Power 
is exercised when in a situation of uncertainty, a person has the 
ability to impose his decision. 
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Within the boundaries of the moral economy, black mine workers possessed 
power rather than authority. During the 1940's, black miners undoubtedly 
established informal power structures on a number of levels, that 
interacted with the formal mechanisms of control on the collieries. This 
chapter shows that through these informal structures, the workforce 
exercised a fair degree of influence in determining their conditions of 
existence. It is tempting to over-estimate the extent of this power when 
one looks at the number of times that management acceded to workers' 
demands during strikes. Ultimately however, any power that the workers 
exercised remained subsumed under the dominance and control of the mine 
management and compound structure. In Moodie's words, the "moral 
economy" of a mine defined mutually "acceptable" elements within a 
system of political domination and economic appropriation' (7). It 
served as a framework, defining the rules of conflict for both the 
dominant and subordinate groups. 
A closer examination of the notion of the moral economy reveals that it 
operated primarily within the context of the daily lives of the black 
workers, both above and underground. Van Onselen found this to be the 
case when he commented on worker resistance on the mines at the turn of 
the century. He stated that although workers were 
'constrained by the restrictive and coercive environment 
of compounds, they (the migrant workers) were never-the-less 
able to resist in the nooks and crannies of the day-to-day 
situation ... (Although) not unionised ... they could organise or 
participate in strike action in a wide variety of situations'. 
(8) 
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On the collieries, the minimum expectations demanded of the daily life 
and inscribed in this unwritten contract of the moral economy were, 
- food of a certain standard 
- wages that were in keeping with other mines 
- limits on the amount of personal assault underground 
- fairness in personal disputes which were adjudicated by 
the Compound Manager and sometimes the Induna 
- equal treatment of the different "tribal" groups by the 
compound manager and other mine officials 
- accommodation of worker's private lives in terms of 
issues such as homosexuality, beerbrewing, friends and 
other overtly "forbidden" practices. 
The extent to which the actions of the workforce were prescribed by the 
i nforma 1 codes of conduct inscribed in the moral economy becomes 
manifest through an investigation of the causal factors of strike action 
on these mines. For the most part, the causes of the strikes can be 
attributed to the workers' perceptions that management had clearly 
broken the minimum expectations contained in their unwritten contract 
with the workforce. A noticeable trend was that war time conditions 
caused a definite degeneration of the standard on living on the mines, 
(as was the case throughout South Africa). This upset the delicate 
balance of the terms of the moral economy and intensified worker 
dissatisfaction. A more in depth study in the following section of the 
grievances expressed by the workers during strike action clearly 
illustrates this view. 
An additional point to be made was that much of the strike action 
appeared to be extemporaneous; in reports on strike action there is 
frequent reference to the fact that the management were caught unaware 
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by the "natives" actions. The oft repeated accounts are that 'Native 
labourers had come out unexpectedly on strike' or that 'the compound 
manager who visited the compound at various times during the day had no 
suspicion that the workers were discontented in any way or had 
contemplated striking'(9). The extemporaneous nature of the strikes 
intimates that the terms of the moral economy were deeply internalised 
within the consciousness of the workforce. 
C) CAUSES OF STRIKE ACTION 
What follows is a schematic outline of the major grievances expressed by 
workers during strike action. The information has been gathered from the 
Native Commission and the Commissioner of Police reports on the strikes 
on the collieries. There is no analysis of these grievances at this 
point in the study. 
The most frequent grievance of workers during strike action was directed 
against the Compound Manager of the mine. 
that the Compound Manager did not investigate 
The central allegation was 
the workers' complaints 
and he was thereby held responsible for the continuation of the existent 
problems experienced by the workers. Grievances against the Compound 
Manager were often but not necessarily accompanied by complaints made 
against the Induna. He was likewise accused of not giving the workers a 
sympathetic hearing. 
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The issue of working hours featured as the second most frequent cause of 
strike action. Working hours underground were exceptionally long and 
'during winter months miners and underground officials seldom saw any 
sunshine except on Sundays' (10). Although the working week was 48 hours 
there was a great deal of overtime. This was especially true during 
the war years when the demand for coal rocketed with the bourgeoning of 
wartime industry. In 1943, in order to aid production, the collieries 
were exempted from the Mines and Works Regulation No. 344 which had 
previously limited the hours of work underground on the collieries (11). 
Workers often accused the management of not paying them overtime and 
organised holiday leave was an unknown. 
On Abor Colliery a worker's statement during a strike at the beginning 
of the war revealed the incredibly long working hours that were demanded 
of workers: 
'I am employed by the above company on machines underground. We 
went on strike against the manner in which the management was 
treating us. Last month there was a change in the turning out of 
shifts. Usually the shifts turns out (sic) 4.30 am and knocked off 
at 4.30pm except boys required to do overtime which they were paid 
for. Now the shifts turned out at 3am and returned at 8pm without 
any overtime being paid. The manager was approached about these 
complaints of starting early and returning late' (12). 
A shift from 6am to 3.30pm was accepted by the workers but most shifts 
were over 12 hours long. Even the White Mine Workers Union took up the 
issue of working hours. In 1946, the Union addressed the Collieries 
Committee of the Chamber of Mines. The Report stated that 
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The Committee undertook to investigate the hours of work on the 
individual collieries with the view to establishing, where possible, a 
greater uniformity in such hours'. (13) 
Ironically, the investigation resulted only in the extension of the 
exemption granted under Regulation 344, which meant 
continued to have a free hand in determining 
underground. 
the 
the 
coal owners 
hours of work 
Over and above the lengthy working hours, workers were morally outraged 
at the wages paid on the collieries. Disputes over wages differed from 
mine to mine. Generally, wages were not uniform but were determined by 
the worker's age, apparent physical ability and the amount of work that 
a labourer did. The Native Labour Regulation Act made it illegal for the 
Mining Industry to employ "Natives" below the age of 18 for light 
surface work. This regulation was largely disregarded by the colliery 
management and there were considerable numbers of youth, mere boys, 
doing surface work. Problems often arose over the payment of these under 
age workers as Management was intent on treating each juvenile worker's 
case individually. The differential treatment of these young workers 
created tensions and jealousies amongst them. 
The management justified the incredibly low wages on the mines by the 
free food and medical services they provided. Each black interviewee 
remembered explicitly the wage scale on the mines during the 1940's; 
management paid black underground workers 2 shillings a shift, while 
surface workers were paid 1 shilling 10 pence a day. An underground 
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manager, working on the collieries in the 40's, expressed horror at the 
type of wages that he was paying his black miners at the time (14). 
A frequent issue concerning wages was that the workers were not properly 
paid for overtime work. This was particularly serious during the war 
when workers were forced to work almost double shifts. On investigation 
it was usually found that the marking of overtime tickets was done in a 
haphazard way and no proper records were kept. The amount of overtime 
earned by workers was seldom properly explained and the Native 
Commissioner stressed how important it was for the labourers to know 
what they were earning otherwise great confusion arose. 
In 1944, the Chamber of Mines announced that all mines affiliated to it 
had agreed to a 5d increase per shift for underground workers and a 4d 
increase for surface workers. This fixed the minimum wages on the mines 
belonging to the Chamber at 2s/5d and 2s/1d per shift respectively. In 
1943, the Chamber of Mines recommended that 'the minimum rates of pay to 
underground and surface workers on the gold mines should also be applied 
to colliery Natives' (15). Many of the collieries in Witbank however, 
were not affiliated to the Chamber in the 40's and their wages remained 
below this fixed rate. The unaffiliated collieries' wage policies were 
most likely a factor in spawning the series of strikes that occurred 
around the issue of wages after 1944. 
A further issue that formed an essential aspect of the moral economy of 
the mine was that of food, and increasingly during the 1940's food 
became a pivotal factor causing strike action. Complaints around food 
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ranged from the dissatisfaction with the size of the rations, to the 
quality of the food and the fact that it was only available at specific 
times of the day. A valuable illustration of the way that these 
complaints manifested themselves, and an indication of the general 
importance of food on the mines, was the demands laid before the Native 
Commissioner of Witbank during a strike at the Transvaal and Delagoa Bay 
Colliery in 1945. The Commissioner expressed the workers' demands as 
follows: 
The occupants of a room demanded that each person receive their 
rations individually instead of the occupants of the room being 
supplied jointly. 
The labourers wanted porridge in the morning in addition to the usual 
rations of bread, maheu, and coffee, claiming that the latter three 
foodstuffs were insufficient nourishment for the day's work ahead 
of them. 
- On Saturdays these labourers prefer rations of raw meat instead of 
cooked meat in their stew. 
Their meat rations contain mainly off-fall (sic) instead of a better 
class of meat. 
- The married labourers are not allowed to take their food rations to 
their huts in the compound in order to share some with their 
families. 
- Natives employed on surface work are being fed twice per day instead 
of three times per day (16). 
These demands recurred frequently in a similar fashion to those cited 
above. The issue of food prompting strike action, particularly in 
relation to the size of rations, was exacerbated by the general shortage 
of food in South Africa during the war. Albert Simelane recounted how in 
1939 when 'the war of Hitler started, the miners were not getting meat -
they were getting tined beef - what the meat was made of I don't know -
perhaps donkeys, horses ... They told the people that meat was going to 
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the soldiers. The people were very tired of this beef business' (17). 
The food crisis did not stop when the war ended. In 1945, the Department 
of Native Affairs issued a notice 'to all Natives employed on the 
mines', informing them that: 
, ... owing to the recent very severe drought and the consequent 
acute shortage of slaughter stock, it is not possible for 
butchers ... to obtain sufficient supplies of meat for their 
customers. This affects the mines as well, and the usual weekly 
meat ration issued to Native mine workers will be slightly 
reduced ... The Government wishes to be clearly understood that the 
reduction is ... in no way due to the fault of the mines ... and knows 
that it can rely on you, as in the past, not to complain but to 
accept the position as being unavoidable'. (18) 
In July 1946, another Government notice was issued instructing the 
mining groups to further reduce their fresh meat rations because 
shortages in supplies of fresh meat had not improved. The notices 
applied only to "Native mine workers". The food shortages referred to 
continued well into the late 40's. The "Natives" did not "accept the 
position as being unavoidable" and food continued to be an ongoing 
catalyst of strike action. As late as 1950, the food crisis had not been 
resolved. The following letter was written anonymously in Sesuto from a 
worker at Greenside Colliery to the Native Commissioner of Witbank: 
'Kindly receive my letter in which I beg to inform you that here at 
Greenside, we are starving, although we get rations but half, 
particularly porridge. I wish to appeal to you as you will soon 
say that we are not doing the proper thing. Furthermore, I wish to 
advise you Sir, to send send someone from your office for general 
investigation of such respect. Finally I would like to draw your 
attention to the fact that people will soon go on strike against 
him ... '. (19) 
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The Chamber of Mines seemed largely unaware of the disturbances that 
arose around food. In the 1945 Annual Report they stated that: 
'Considering the difficulties that have arisen during the year 
through shortages on certain items of food, collieries have been 
free from unrest among the Native employees'. (20) 
Speaking on the food situation on the mines in the 1940's an observer 
commented that 'feeding arrangements were primitive and balanced diets 
quite unknown' (21). 
The last grievance that arose with great frequency was that of assaults. 
The workers complained that they were receiving unfair treatment 
underground. An anecdote told by Albert Simelane demonstrates the 
hostility that assaults underground could generate. He recalls how a 
white miner poked a certain worker who was part of his underground team. 
As a consequence of the miner's action, the worker picked up a pick 
handle and starting chasing him through the mine. 'Then the miner had to 
run for his dear life, otherwise he was dead'. The miner never returned 
to his job underground (22). In every Native Commissioner's report on 
the mines and in each interview situation, assaults arose as a primary 
issue of concern. 
The grievances around compound managers, food, wages, assaults and 
working hours, were the primary triggers for strike action on the 
collieries. Within the framework of the moral economy, the workers 
cohered around a set of minimum expectations that they held in 
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relationship to these issues. 
D)MANAGERIAL AUTOCRACY ON THE COLLIERIES. 
It is not enough, however, simply to state the recurring grievances 
cited as causes of the strike action and to understand these issues as 
being an integral part of the moral economy on the mines. It is 
imperative also to investigate the reasons that these particular areas, 
rather than others, featured as sources of tension for miners. Food and 
wages were obvious catalysts in strike action. Food is of course the 
basic means of survival and especially important in the context of hard 
labour conditions. Further, in most cases,the mine management did not 
pay sufficiently high wages to support a family. To understand the 
worker's animosity towards the Compound Managers, Indunas, and other 
senior officials on the mines is a more complex issue and needs to be 
contextualised within the overall nature and structure of managerial 
control. This section will focus specifically on the aspect of 
managerial autocracy on the collieries. 
A highly autocratic and repressive managerial structure and form of 
control was a central feature of the South African mining industry 
throughout the 40's and has continued to be an issue on the mines until 
the present. There were however, several factors unique to the 
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collieries during the 1940's which contributed to the intensification of 
this managerial autocracy. One such factor can be located in the 
particular class of people who formed the core of the management system 
on the coal as opposed to gold mines. 
Initially the majority of mine personnel on the collieries came from the 
British Isles. These Welsh and Scottish miners were attracted by the 
higher rates of pay and the reputedly better working conditions on South 
African mines. The number of miners of British descent did not decrease, 
as virtually every male offspring joined the colliery. In the 40's, many 
of the miners were third generation. They formed the core of the 
management structure in that they occupied most of the official senior 
positions on the mines. They fashioned the mines along the lines of the 
British system with which they were familiar. Labour relations however, 
differed vastly from anything that they were accustomed to on mines in 
their home country and these "foreigners" were quick to adopt the racist 
practices and discriminatory attitudes of their South African 
They became increasingly protective over their positions 
It should be remembered that it was these overseas miners 
counterparts. 
of authority. 
who were the first to initiate the white mining union which sought to 
privileged positions of white miners in the labour 
During the 1940's there were several registered and 
protect the 
hierarchy. 
recognised "European" Trade Unions on the coal mines 
important of which was the Mine Workers Union. 
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the most 
There were also many Afrikaners on the mines from the turn of the 
century but they seldom occupied positions of authority in the 1920's 
and the 1930's. The reason for this was that the vast majority were 
farmers who had either bought farms which they were paying off, or they 
were saving in order to buy a farm. They perceived their involvement in 
mining as a part-time activity which would enable them to acquire the 
financial resources to become full-time farmers. Their mining 
involvement was therefore short term and motivated by economic 
imperatives. Initially therefore they came onto the mines at the lowest 
level in the white labour hierarchy, occupying positions of handymen and 
miners while all the senior positions were occupied by English speaking 
second or third generation foreign miners. This remained the status quo 
up until the Second World War: 
'Because the mines were generally small, the chances of promotion 
were few and far between. You stayed in your job, certainly as an 
official. You would only change if you were a good miner and got 
bought up by a large company who offered a large salary and a free 
house'. (23) 
The war created conditions which forced a change in the structure of 
white labour relations on the mines. The majority of the English-
speaking mining community supported the war effort and the young and 
able-bodied miners enlisted in the army. This was in contrast to the 
majority of the Afrikaners on the mines who were opposed to South 
Africa's participation in the war. At the end of 1940, 134 men were on 
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full-time military service, that is approximately 10 per cent of the 
European personnel on the collieries (24). This figure increased as the 
war progressed and the Chamber of Mines Annual Reports frequently 
alluded to the shortage of skilled "European" miners. In 1943, the 
Chamber applied for the release of coal miners from full-time military 
service to 'overcome the difficulties experienced by the Coal Mining 
Industry in meeting the increased demand for coal with depleted European 
staffs and in order to ensure that in the event of a National emergency, 
the production of coal would not be interrupted' (25). 
The departure of many of the English-speaking senior management 
officials during the war created new opportunities on the collieries and 
there was an influx of untrained and unskilled Afrikaners into the 
workforce. This class of raw farmers were now able to fill those 
managerial positions that had previously been blocked the English 
speaking miners. They had had little experience however, particularly in 
the development of systems and procedures of labour control and this in 
part explains the highly autocratic management structure that evolved 
and functioned on the collieries during the years under investigation. 
The increasingly untrained nature of the "European" workforce was 
obviously a problem for the coal industry. In 1943 the Chamber of Mines 
appointed a Special 
shortage of technically 
Sub-Committee with a 
trained personnel 
executive positions on the collieries ... ' (26). 
'view to overcoming the 
for the appointment to 
The unskilled nature of 
the miners occupying senior positions during the war obviously had an 
impact upon the black workforce which had to toil under the their rigid 
supervision. 
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The specific nature and requirements of the coal mining industry was a 
further factor in contributing to managerial autocracy and the attitude 
of white miners more generally. The coal mining industry was referred to 
as the "Orphan Annie" of mining. It attracted substantially less 
attention than gold mining, this factor being reflected in the scant 
attention paid to coal in the Chamber of Mines Annual Reports (27). 
Part of the reason for this is that coal mining was, and still is, a 
less complex process than that of gold mining. It relies on less 
technologically sophisticated methods to extract the coal. In the early 
years, University degrees catered for the skills required on the gold 
mines while coal mining was hardly taught to mine engineers. White coal 
miners simply needed a blasting certificate to work underground. This 
resulted in people with formal mining skills rarely being attracted to 
the coal mines. It was only in 1946 that the University of the 
Witwatersrand undertook to establish a course for the degree of Bachelor 
of Science in the Branch of Coal Mining. In 1947 the first Technical 
College was established in Witbank for 'official learners employed on 
the collieries in those areas' (28). However, the marked increase of 
trained personnel on the coal mines did not take place until the late 
60's. The turning point was the advent of open cast mining which was 
more technically orientated and where greater skills were required to 
operate the collieries. The Anglo American Coal division (Amcoal) and 
Rand Mines began transferring their trained staff from the gold to the 
coal mines. 
The "lower status" of coal mining was compounded by the rigid price 
controls imposed on the coal industry by the central government. This 
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was the result of the government's efforts to subsidise industrial 
development by limiting the profit potential of the coal mines. 
The 
'The expansion of the gold mlnlng industry and the development of 
secondary industries after South Africa departed from the Gold 
Standard in 1932 caused a large increase in the demand for coal ... 
Coal was an important resource in industrial development as it was 
used to generate power'. (29) 
Coal Industry's growth alongside that of secondary 
industrialisation in South Africa was not reflected in economic terms. 
As a result of the government's price controls, the coal mines were 
never able to match the huge profits generated by the gold mines In 
conventional parlance, the coal trade was referred to as a 'struggle'. 
A Mine Manager's memories of the coal industry in the early years 
highlighted an intense awareness of the precariousness nature of the 
coal industry: 
'Coal mining certainly wasn't profitable in the 40's, 50's and 
60's. The coal price was maintained at an almost unchanging level 
and collieries cut each others' throats in trying to get markets. 
We worked on a shoestring and there were no big profits made until 
the takeoff of the industry in the 70's because of the oil 
crisis ... '. (30) 
The imperatives of capital accumulation dictated all facets of mining 
policy, from labour issues to the choice of mining method. The general 
lack of prosperity necessitated that the conditions of employment, the 
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living conditions and wage standards on the coal mines were vastly 
inferior to those on the gold mines. Not withstanding minor 
improvements, the relatively primitive and often appalling conditions on 
the coal mines extended from the early years of the coal mining industry 
well into the 40's. The White colliers did not have the advantage of the 
Witwatersrand Gold Mines Employment Provident Fund until 1940. Few 
collieries enjoyed ample supplies of potable water and water-carriers 
were employed on the collieries for this purpose. Sanitation facilities 
were completely inadequate. On many properties there were no bathrooms 
in the "European" houses and water-borne sewerage was non-existent. 
looking back into the past fifty years of the coal mining industry, 
Coulter of the Anglo American Corporation spoke emphatically about the 
poor conditions of both "European and Non-European" employees: 
'Colliery companies were not very interested in the comfort and 
well-being of their employees. Most employees on coming off shift 
had to wash in a tub at home as washing houses were seldom provided 
and the position of men living in single quarters was quite 
pathetic. Native compound accommodation, hospital facilities, 
housing for married Natives ... was crude in the extreme ... With the 
passing years living conditions greatly improved, but it was a slow 
business for colliery companies were just a little loathe to depart 
from the old standards which they thought were good enough' (31). 
Given the skill requirements, the lower profit margins of the coal 
industry and the crude and unsatisfactory living conditions on the coal 
mines, an educated class of miners with formal management skills were 
seldom attracted to the mines. Moreover, in the 1930's, the decline of 
• 
agricultural production led to the forced proletarianisation of sectors 
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of the white agrarian community. This resulted in a new class of poor 
whites" entering the industrial arena, many of whom entered jobs on the 
coal mines. As a consequence of their vulnerable positions in the labour 
market, the black workforce was targeted as the specific site of poor 
white hostility. The particular attitudes of this new urban class 
which often expressed itself in a blatant racism - played into the 
prevalent patterns of managerial autocracy. 
E) THE STRUCTURE AND HIERARCHY OF CONTROL ON THE COLLIERIES. 
The picture that has been painted thus far is a broad sweeping one of 
the nature of management in operation during the 1940's. It suggests 
that from the start of the Second World War, the people occupying the 
positions of Compound Managers, Shift Bosses, Underground Managers etc., 
generally belonged to a lower income group and had little or no formal 
training in any aspect of coal mining. Many of the people had only 
short-term, economic motives for working on the mines. These factors go 
some way in explaining the crude and often unsophisticated form that 
labour relations assumed on the coal mines. This schematic and 
generalised explanation however leaves aspects of labour relations on 
the mines unexplored. A more accurate picture of existent dynamics can 
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only be sketched if one looks at the formal structure and hierarchy of 
control that operated above and below ground. Such an exploration will 
elucidate the all important issue of the manifestation of tensions 
underground between black and white miners, the high incidence of 
assaults and the role the Compound Manager played in the expression of 
worker grievances. First, however, it is pertinent to have a cursory 
understanding of the underground methods of the coal mining industry in 
the 40's. 
In the 40's the method of coal mining was known as "room and pillar" or 
"bord and pillar" mining. The method chosen was largely governed by 
economic factors. The "bord and pillar" method is far cheaper than open 
cast mining as it requires less technological expertise. It is still 
commonly used in South Africa today. It is used particularly where the 
coal seams are thick and close to the surface as is the case with the 
Witbank coalfields. The coal seams in Witbank are horizontal and can be 
likened to the meat in a sandwich. In the 40's they were approximately 
50 feet beneath the surface. 
The "bord and pillar" method involves developing bords or roadways at 
right angles and parallel to each other by blasting out the coal in such 
a way so as to leave square pillars of solid coal to support the roof 
(see diagram). This method results in the extraction of 75% of the 
coal in the working area. 
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Each working section which had at least twelve working faces, 
required the following labour. Firstly, a team of feur people to 
cut the coal. This was semi-skilled work as it involved the 
. 
oper~tion of a coal-cutting machine to cut a slot into the coal 
to allow space for the coal to break into when blasted. Secondly, 
two "drill boys" were required to drill holes into the coal face 
parallel to the. cut which were then charged with explosives to 
bl~st the coal. This was semi-skilled work but it was fairly 
arduous as the drill boys usually had to hold the electric drill 
above their heads in order to place it correctly in the coal 
seam. Next, blasting took place. Only' white miners were able to 
obtain blasting certificates although quite often you would find 
blacks doing the job. Finally, after the coal was blasted and the 
ventilation current had carried away the fumes and dust from the 
blasted coal, loading would commence. Loadin9 was totally 
unskilled work but required great strength and stamina. From 
every blast, approximately 50 tons of coal had to be loaded. 
Conditions underground in the coa~ mines, while reputedly more 
"pleasant" than those of gold mines, r~ar-dl y const i tuted a 
favourable working environment. Generally speaking, there was 
relatively poor ventilation, a situation worsened by the huge 
amount of black dust generated by the cutting and blasting of the 
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coal. During the 40's, there were no water supplies underground 
to settle the dust and keep the place "dampe,j down". The 
follow.ing account given by a t1itle Manyer affords one a 
descriptive view of the prevailing underground condltions: 
'It was like a fog underground during coal cutting. It 
was very difficult to see anyone around you as there 
was a great deal of coal dust. You came out of the mine 
black - the only part that was whIte was around the 
mouth. People who came out of the coal mines were 
pitch, P~~Ch black'. (32) 
On cet- tain mines, in addi t ion to the pr"oblem of coal dust, 
conditions below qround were extremely hazardous resulting in a 
high fatality and accident rate. Underground deaths and injuries 
were most often caused by methane gas, Which when released during 
the coal blasting process caused flie--damp or methane 
explosions. Moreover, coal has a tendency towards spontaneous 
combust ion thus - causing many underground f in~:;. This made life 
extremely difficult for underground officials and workers. 
Al though pl-esent day techn iques have bec-::Hne fI1(We sophist icated, 
coal mirling remains hazardous for those working underground. 
Besides the direct physical hazards of coal mining, there was the 
constant threat of miners' contracting pneumoconiosis from the 
inhalation of mineral dust. The Miners' PhthiSis Commission in 
1942 claimed that there were very few cases of this disease on 
the collieries in the Transvaal, (33) but it is very likely that 
the number of cases recorded was far fewer thah the real number 
of miners who contracted Silicosis. 
39 
Under these difficult and often tense working conditions, the 
disciplined organisation of the underground labour force was 
essential if production targets and profits were to be realised. 
Discipline was enforced by an un~er9round labour hierarchy headed 
by the Mine Captain, the overseer of underground production. His 
direct subordinate, the Shift Boss, was 1n charge of the 
functioning and efficacy of two or three working sections. He was 
also custodian of the safety regulations promulgated under the 
Mine and Works Act were met. At each working place there was a 
, 
miner, who was, by legal fiat of the Mine and Works Act, a white 
man. He saw that tUnnels or bords being blasted were straight. 
His direct subordinate was the "Boss Boy" - that figure of 
popular mythology and ubiquitous critique, today politely 
r-efer-red to as the "Team Leader" in charge of the coal 
cutters, drill operators and loaders. 
Essentially it was the miner and his Boss Boy who were 
responsible for disciplining the workers and were accountable to 
the shift boss if production schedules were not met. An interview 
with an underground manager revealed that conversations amongst 
boss boys would often revolve around techniques Dy which they 
were able to ensure the best production results (34). The miner 
and boss boy seldom had genuine super-visor-y skills but wielded a 
great deal of influence underground; they were 1n charge of 
recommendations for promotion and of the metering out of 
punlshment. However, they often tended to ignore formal 
requlatory channels and took the law into their own hands by 
assaulting the workers underground. 
40 
These assaults generated a great deal of tension at the point of 
production. In the opinion of one worker, if a mine is to avoid 
strikes then 
'The Mine Marlager, his assistants, the Compound Manager, 
etc., all these big shots, they must be brave enough and 
they must never let any miner or Mine Captain to assault or 
get out of control. Once that person is out of control, that 
mine is having a strike. These people must be brave enough 
to control each and every worker'. (35) 
This type of contr61 was seldom in operatior: on the mines and the 
hiqh level of assaults remained a constant source of trouble. The 
assaults have often been explained as stemming from poor 
communication systems on the mines. Considering the 
communication difficulties inherent in an linguistically 
Ileterogeneous workforce this explanation is highly credible. 
Further, ethnic differences gave rise to varyil19 perceptions and 
expectations thus creating a potentially explosive climate above 
and below ground. Fanagal0, an informal lan9u~ge developed by 
mine management, was an attempt to transcend the heterogeneity of 
this meltinq pot. Fanaqalo was functional yet remairled inadequate 
in overcoming the complexities and bridging the divides among the 
mininq workforce. It was structured simply for the purpose of 
giving commands, a typical example of which was the phrase, 
'hamba faku 10 broom', which was the equivalellt of 'go fetch the 
broom'. Fanagalo's bias towards imperative and instructional 
18nquaqe meant that it lacked the complexities and nuances of a 
formal, communicative medium. In one miner's opinion, 'Fanagalo 
makes people stupid', (36) a comment which is a biting 
indication of the baseness of the language. 
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By virtue of his skin colour, the Boss Boy was a central figure 
to the white miner in the communication network underground. In 
situations where the miner spoke neither African language or 
Fanagalo, the Boss Boy acted as a conduit between miner and 
worker. In such cases, it would seem that the white miner 
exercised very little real authority as the communication 
barriers meant that his authority had been transferred to his 
subordinate, the Boss Boy. Inherent in h19 position as mediator 
and" interpreter" was a high level of ft-ustj~atlon . This resulted 
in the Boss Boy's form of contr-ol be in9 high1'1 autocrat ie and 
ther"e was a general tendency to resol ve disagr-eements ar ising 
out of communication difficulties violent means. 
Consequently, the Boss Boy was often the appropriate target of 
WOI-ker hostility. The actions of the miner and Boss Boy were 
often founded on the assumption that their authority in the 
workplace was indisputable. This assumption earned them the 
reputation of being the 'strong men' on the mines. 
The followinq quotations explicitly suggest that communication 
difficulties were a determinate factor in the existent 
conflictual relationships underground: 
'A man who spoke the language of the employee generally 
dldn't have a hassle - he explained 'n'hat he wanted and would 
qet it. A qood example was Piet de Wet, who was Afrikaans-
speaklng and had a Boss Boy called Fifteen. He didn't really 
speak any of the Bantu (sic) languages but he and his Boss 
boy could communicate perfectly. They had their own lingo 
and the job was always 100 percent - the tonnage came up'. 
(37) 
On the other hand a man 
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'who spoke very little of the employes's language and spoke 
Fanagalo, didn't communicate correctly_ Invariably the thing 
wasn't done as he intended it and then he would lose his 
temrer and ZAP! He was always thrashing someone and the boss 
boy would work in exactly the same manner. He would follow 
the example of his boss' (38). 
The particular communicative relationship established between the 
m1ner and boss-boy thus affected the form of control underground. 
The incident of assaults however, cannot be solely attributed to 
communication diffi9ulties. Rather, conflict was an expression of 
a nexus of factors. 'The white miner's insistence on respect due 
to his whlte skin and his demand that blacks lump unquestioningly 
to his evet-y command' increased the tensions underground (39). 
The following statements are testimony to the fact that the 
assaults also arose as a result of this assertion of white 
dominatlon and a racist mentality in the workplace. An additional 
point to be made is that the assaults by 80ss Boys on fellow 
black workers was usually a gauge of the level of frustration 
bot-ne out of the conditions of underground wo!-k: 
'Assaults were qUite common because whltes WOUldn't accept 
black cheek and this led to clouting. It was difficult to 
get blacks to do the jobs conscientiously which caused a lot 
of frustration and this also led to the tendency of 
clouting. There was a high level of frustration underground 
especially under difficult conditions or when things went 
wrong. Black on black assaults arese through this 
frustration. The Boss Boy is a valued jOb. If his labour 
doesn't do the work properly he also gets worried'. (40) 
Another example of this attitude is reflected in the following 
statement: 
'The refusal to work which led to a fine or jail sentence 
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didn't affect 11im (the black worker). The most effective way 
to deal with his refusal to work was to clout him. If he 
deserved a clout he would usually accept it. Unfair assaults 
would be reported and it would be left to the compound 
manager to deal with it'. (41) 
A certain Mine Captain on Tweefontein Colliery gave the following 
testimony in court after assaulting an underground worker for not 
doing the job that he was instructed to do. His statement clearly 
bears out the point that the assaults were related to the racial 
stereotyping of black workers as inferior: 
'His (the worker's) method of putting his questions to me 
was very provoking in view of troutle that I have had with 
him over a period of more than one month. When he spoke to 
me in the way he did I lost my temper and gave him a smack 
in the face ... 1 told him to get out of the mine immediately 
which he did'. (42) 
The workers' experience of assaults did not always give rise to 
active resistance. A certain level of violence exerted by the 
authorities was expected and accepted as part of "the given 
order of things". This can be understocd as illustrative of the 
efficacy of the dominant ideology operating both within the 
wOl-kplace and within the br'oader social context. The nature of 
the ideological hegemony was such that, to an extent, the 
inequitable relations of subordination and domination 
experienced as "natural" by the black workforce. fhis explains 
why a certCl.in level of violence was exper ierlced by the black 
workforce as legitimate and remained uncontested. 
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How then does one explain the wor"ker's expression of resistance 
~gainst the assaults 7 It is at this point that the notion of a 
moral economy can be seen as an operative force negotiating the 
terms of the management-labour relationship on the mines. The 
concept of the moral economy represents the existence of 
countervailing force challenging the assertion of total hegemonic 
control by the Mine Management. Thus, when the level of assaults 
exercised by miner and Boss Boy were perceived as overstepping 
the bounds of their authority, the workers felt that they had 
suffered an inju~tice. The terms of the moral economy had been 
breached and the workers took action. The worker was entitled to 
lay a charge against his assailant who had to pay a fine if found 
guilty. Although the mine management officially frowned on 
assaults underground, they were tolerated 1n the interests of 
"get t inq the .job done". 
There is no evidence ttlat the Boss Boys were drawn from any 
particular ethnic grouping but very often East Coasters filled 
the position, one explanation being that tthey appeared more 
intelligent' (43). It is likely that nepotism operated 
underground with the Boss Boy favouring members of his own group. 
'Put a Basotho in charge of a Basotho gang because they'd accept 
their own type better' (44). This probably served to increase the 
ethnic tensions that characterised life on the mines which will 
be explored later. 
There is very little evidence of spontaneous collective action 
underground, partially because the conditions underground made it 
difficult for workers to vent grievances during wor-king hours. It 
45 
discontent with underground working conditions and the frequency 
of assaults found their outlet. The usual scenario was that the 
miner/s concerned would lay a complaint with the Indunas and 
Compound Manager, who were then expected to deal with the issue. 
There are important parallels between the relationship of the 
Compound Manaqer to the Induna and that of the Miner to the Boss 
Boy underground. The relationship between the Compound Manager 
and Induna affec~ed their style of control over labour in the 
same way as that of the Miner and Boss Boy. The Induna was 
basicalJ.y the mouthpiece of the Compound Ma~ager and acted as the 
interpreter and mediator in the context of compound life. Both 
tIle Boss-Boy and Induna were selected by mine management rather 
th8n the workers and they were answerable to their white 
superiors. There were also significant differences however. 
rirstly, the Compound Manager and Induna carried more authority 
and status within the managerial hierarchy. The Induna was the 
most senior black employee on the colliery. This was indicated by 
the Coal Committees suggestion in 1947 that the Induna be paid on 
a monthly basis and that he should be grarlted fourteen 
consecutive days annual leave (45 
The Miner and Boss Boy reported on conditiors underground to the 
Induna who then reported them to the Compound Manager. Secondly, 
whereas the Boss Boy was usually the focus of worker hostility 
underground, it was the Compound Manager and not the Induna who 
was usually labelled the oppressor above ground. 
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The centrality of the Compound Manager from the black workers' 
perspective can be explained more broadly in terms of the 
workers' conditions on the mines. By law they were compelled to 
live in the compound and spent the majority of their off-duty 
hours there. According to Goffman who wrote on total 
institutions, the workers were forced 
'to lead an enclosed, formally administered round of 11fe, 
and the man who controls this "round of life" is the 
Compound 
Manager' (46). 
The workers regarded the Compound Manager as the most high 
pI-of ile person in the wor Id of the compound, the person who had 
the power to intervene if a crisis situation arose. In most 
examples of worker dissatisfaction, grievances were vented 
against the Compound Manager and he was held personally 
responsible for not improving the conditions of the workers. A 
Compound Manager expressed this point very clearly; 
'The Natives never go to the miner to rectify (their 
grievances) but take it for granted that they were done in 
... by me'. (47 ) 
Several of the Native Commissioner's reports stated that: 
'As the Natives largely blame the Compound Manager for their 
alleged ill-treatment they demand his dischnrge by the mine 
authorities'. 48 
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The wot-kers' perspective of the role of the Compound Manager was 
not wholly out of line with the government's definition of his 
job. By virtue of Proclamations 3 of 1917 and 26 of 1925, the 
Compound Manager had to be licensed annually by the Chief Bantu 
AFfairs Commissioner. The issue of the licence was on a 
discretion~ry basis. According to this proclamation, the 
Compound Manager- had to "supet-vise and contr'ol" the migrants and 
see to the conditions and sanitation of the compound. He was the 
only per SOil who could give permission to visitors to enter the 
compound. Under the Proclamation, he was legally obliged to 
investigate the workers' complaints. The Proclamation ultimately 
gave the Compound Manager the power to ensure that the compound 
was physically and symbolically spparated from the outside world. 
In practice, the Compound Manager's authority was exercised in an 
arbitrary and discretionary fashion. Because he had no formal 
qualifications, he relied on his "experience" in dealing with the 
workers. According to the Chief Induna on Greenside Colliery, tas 
long as you treat people nicely they'll like you. Tl)ey will never 
hate you'. This was a simple maxim of success. In mining circles 
a Compound Manager was judged by the amount of labour that was 
attracted to the mines. A colliery in Natal had an almost 
voluntary labour fOrce and this was attributed entirely to the 
Compound Manaqet-'s skills in dealing with the labour force (49). 
On mines where worker disturbances were mOr-e frequent, it was 
difficult for the Compound Manager simply to explain them away as 
minol- incidents of worker discontent. 
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Beside the centrality of the Compound Manager in the compound, 
there was another reason why he featured more prominently as a 
cwievance amongst workers than the Induna. This was related to 
the way in which the Induna usually carried out nis duties. The 
Induna was appointed to maintain order in the compound and to 
prevent drinking,. dagga-smokin3 and homosexuality. The Chief 
Induna of Greenside Colliery that was men'Cioned above suggested 
that in general, the "formally forbidden practices" were ignored 
by the Indunas so long as they did not disrupt the order of the 
compound. Thus there was a compound n:lt:_~_t9., "unwr- it ten tacit 1 y 
agreed upon laws", that was established between the compound 
dwellel-s and the Indunas. This !!l_t._~_:t9._ served to undercut the 
Induna's authority in the eyes of the workers. 
It is now clearer why the figure of the Compound Manager and 
and, in fewer instances, the Induna, was the focus of grievances 
during strike action. The most frequent accusation made against 
the Compound Manager was that he did not qive the workers an 
audience. At a strike at the Navigation Colliery in 1941, the 
workers complained that, 'when they are assaulted underground the 
Compound Manaqer did not go into their complaints' (50). In the 
words of a worker on the Colliery: 
'We complained to the manager but he did !lot 
and he is a violent master and mostly feared 
decided to go on strike. Further what caused 
indiscriminate assault of the boys'. (51) 
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listen to us 
by the boys. We 
a strike is his 
The Chief Induna stated that it was an important requisite for 
the Compound Manager to take immediate action when an assault was 
'If the wOI-ker br ings the report to the Compound Manager 
about the Mine Captain, the Compound Manager must not favour 
the Mine Captain and not listen to this report ... He must go 
straight and warn the Mine Captain, no matter how friendly 
he is with thi? person, that" This thing is no good, you 
better stop it'now!" If it goes on and the Mine Captain 
doesn't do it, then a strike will go on'. (52) 
In the light of the serious consequences that could arise from a 
Compound Manager ignoring a worker's complaints, it is surprising 
how many times this actually occurred. When questioned by the 
Native Commissioner, the Compound Managers often stated that they 
did not listen to the complaints as 'most of them were of a 
trivial nature' (53). This attitude placed the Compound Manager's 
relat ionship with his workers in ser ious .1eopt.wdy. On Tweefontein 
CoIl iel- y the accusat ion that the Compound Manager" 'tai led to hold 
a proper investigation and take appropriate action on receiving 
the complaint', (54) erupted into a major fracas. The Compound 
Manager, in an attempt to defend his positIon, offered the 
following explanation to the Native CommiSSioner: 
'When I received the complaint, I got in touch with the Mine 
Captain who told me that he had hit the complainant one blow 
in the face with his open hand because the latter, King 
George who was a machine boy, had not carried out his 
instructions to go on cutting the coal and with his gang had 
remained idle for five hours, and had been insolent when 
remonstrated with'. 55 
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It appears from this that the Compound manager simply accepted 
the Mine Captain's version and made no attempt to find out King 
George's. The Compound Manager abrogated any responsibility for 
the Mine Captain's actions and impressed upon King George to 
retUl-n to wor-k: 
'As the Native was in the wrong in the first instance, I 
then ordered him to return to work. This the Native refused 
to do ... I tol'd him .. You are an old boss boy and know 
better. You' know that you are contracted for any kind of 
work underground. I am not responsible for the allocation of 
work underground. What the Mine Captain tells instructs you 
to do you' I'"e to do." Only when threatened with cr imina I 
procedur-es ... (did) King George agr-ee, to return to the 
Waterman Shaft'. (56) 
The Compound Manager's dismissal of King George's complaint and 
King George's ultimate agreement to return to work was not the 
end of the incident. The following day, the Mine Captain 
concerned reported that (the Natives had adopted a sullen and 
provocative attitude underground and threats against other mine 
officials had been overheard ... Rumours were received that the 
Natives had made threats of personal injury to the chief Compound 
Manager, Mr. de Kock' (57). 
The next day, the wOI-kers went on str 11..:03. As i=.. ,-esul t of the 
'attitude of the Natives', and what Mr. de Kock considered to be 
the 'ill feeling engendered among the European miners and 
residents of Tweefontein', he Signalled the alarm for (concerted 
action to be taken by the white male 'population who were 
prepared to resort to firearms, if necessary' (58). 
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He suggested that a force of armed police be called to arrest the 
known ringleaders and others suspected of inciting strike action. 
The General Manager of the mine later explained to the District 
Commandant from Middleburg that the 'feelings among Europeans was 
high ... and that if there was any further trouble there was a 
possibility of the European miners taking the law into their own 
hands' (59). 
Mt-. de Kock was unable to disclose any definite breaches of the 
. 
law on the part of the "Natives" except fo( the alleged threats 
and rumours made by the workers. The incident demonstrates not 
only a pat-anOia and fear of action by the "Natives", but also the 
serious situation that could arise out of what black workers 
per-ceived as unfair treatment by the Compound Manager. The events 
that occurred on the mine were completely out of proportion with 
the cause of the disturbance. The results of this particular case 
was that the Mine Captain was suspended, in his words 'for my own 
personal safety', (60) and the Compound Manager was dismissed. 
The dismissal of the Compound Manager was a frequent outcome of a 
disturbance. In most instances where allegations arose around the 
Compound Manaqer, the workers would accept nottling less than the 
dismissal or tt-ansfel-ral of the Compound Manager or any other 
mine official concerned. The reply of the workers to the Native 
Commissioner during the strike on Tweefonteln colliery in 1944 
was that: 
'they would not start work unless they received the 
assurance that the Mine Captain, Mr. Wilson, who had 
assaulted one of their men, and the chief Compound Manager, 
Mr. de Kock, who had failed to take up the worker's 
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complaint, were instantly dismissed'. (61) 
Durinq the strike at the Landau Colliery in 1944 where the 
workers demanded the dismi~sal of the induna, alleging that he 
was not impartial and showed favouritism to i,ls relatives and 
friends, the power of the workers was clearly demonstrated. The 
Native Commissioner told the workers that it was not their place 
01- I-iqht to select their own compound manager' and induna and that 
their appointment rested entirely with Mine Management: 
'But as this statement was received with such hostility and 
as the Natives were worked up into such a state of 
antagonism, I feared a general riot and I suggested to the 
General Manager that it would be advisable In the 
circumstances to accede to their request and replace the 
present Induna.' (62) 
The Compound Manager acquiesced in this action. I~ other examples 
when workers simply refused to continue working unless the 
Compound Manaqer was dismissed, tllis was almost always agreed to. 
In many instances, the Native Commissioner also cited the cause 
of strike action as the 'tactlessness of the compound manager' 
(63). In several interviews with Compound Managers, the Native 
Commissioner concluded he did not always 9ive the workers a 
sympathetic hearing and it was often apparent that to the 
Commissioner that he did not carry out his duties in the manner 
prescribed in regard to alleged assaults. Instead of reporting 
the alleqed assaults in writing to the Manager and the Police, he 
investigated the assaults without satisfying the workers. On one 
mine, the Commissioner went so far as to say that 'the Natives 
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have no confidence in the Compound Manager and that he has 
himself to blame for this' (64). In cases where the workers 
cited several reasons for going on strike, the Compound Manager 
usually appeared to be the main reason. 
A unilateral declaration of the Compound Manager as the "guilty 
party" is a Simplistic characterisation of the dynamics of the 
labour relations on the collieries. Although clearly the Compound 
Manager often exacer~ated the Situation by his treatment of the 
the it-
are several factors that can be seen as 
Vindicating his actions. Especially in the case Qf assaults, ttle 
Situation was often more complex than the ~0rkers' perception 
that the Compound Manager was to blame when assaults were not 
dealt with. When an assault charge was brought before the 
Compound Manager, he would have to get the facts completely 
verified so that the Mine Manager would not side step the issue 
and so that he could ensure that some form of discipline was 
exerted against the offender. But is was often very difficult to 
qet witnesses to testify against the miner or Boss Uoy as they 
were afraid of victimisation. There was a strong tendency on the 
part of Mine Captains or white miners to bribe the witnesses. 
Albert Sirllslane, a Chief Induna at Greenside ColI iery) recounted 
the following possible COW-se of events if a wOI"ker had been hi t 
by the their or Mine Captain: 
'If the white miner or Mine Captain hits another man and 
pet-haps the piccan ins are standing nearby... becaUse these 
picannins are working for him down the mine, he'll persuade 
them not to be witnesses. That's how the strike came out. 
When the Compound Manager questions these witnesses, they 
won't talk now because they are scared of the Mine Captain. 
If he tells the Compound Manager that he has witnessed the 
Mine Captain assaUlting that boy, and does not stand by him 
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(the Mine Captain), (the piccanin) will get bad work 
underground. this is what makes people crosS - they are not 
getti~g ~ fair deal underground t • (65) 
In virtually every case study where a Compound Manager was the 
focus of strike action and the workers demanded his dismissal, 
the Compound Manager was newly appOinted on the colliery. A 
likely explanation for this pattern was that a new Compound 
Manager introduced systems of control that were alien to the 
new: methods used disrupted fragile modus 
•....... ~ ....... -....... ~ 
The the 
oper~n~A that had been constructed between workers and management 
within the moral economy of mining life. During the strike on 
N~vigation Colliery in 1941, the Native Commissioner's report 
clearly reflected this point: 
'The Compound Manager, Mr. McMaster, 1s a newcomer and a 
very good man, but the natives find him very strict after 
the slack regime of the last man who was there for 33 years. 
This man was dismissed at the end of last year by the new 
general manaqer.' (66) 
Aqain durinq a strike at the New Sarie Marais Colliery in 1946, 
the Commissioner of the South African Police wrote that, 
'The whole trouble is that the Mine is now under new 
management and the old method of slackness under which the 
mlne operated previously is no 'lonqer- tolerated by the 
1'1anager- and his staff, hence the request of the Natives that 
the Manager and Underground Manager be dismissed before they 
will resume wot-k'. (67) 
And further, at a threatened strike at South Witbank Coal Mines, 
the Native Commissioner reported: 
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'The impression I received about the whole trouble is that 
the ex - Compound Manager has relaxed to a very great extent 
and that they could do as they like, hence their demand. It 
may be that when the new Compound Manager takes over he will 
find matters difficult in the beginning'. (68) 
The old compound manager was perceived as being more relaxed than 
his replacement. This pOints to the likelihood that a dynamic 
process of negotiation was set up between workers and the 
Compound Manager when he entered into his positlon of authority. 
Over time, the Compound Manager conceded in a piecemeal fashion 
. 
. 
to the workers' demands and there was an imperceptible slackening 
of his rule. The continuing process of change and renegotiation 
allowed the workers to assert influence over, and become 
accustomed to, the Compound Manager's particular style of 
contr-ol. 
The above examples of action taken against the Compound Manager, 
and the frequency of his dismissal,. suggest that the Compound 
Managet-'s basis of authority was extremely fragile. They point 
to certain vital features for the Compound Manager to possess if 
he was to malntain control over his fiefdom. The qualities that 
were stressed as being important to the Compound Manager's 
popularity were "upr-ightness and impartiality". It was important 
for the wot-ket-s to perceive him as a "fair" man who would mete 
out justice. Besides these personal attributes, the Compound 
Matlager needed to establish informal networks amongst the workers 
which would facilitate his keeping in touch with the pulse of 
. 
life in the compound. Without these networks it was almost 
impossible for the Compound Manager to gauge the feelings and 
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attitudes of the workers. As has already been pointed out, the 
Induna functioned as the mediator and interpreter for the 
Compound and was a central figure in helping the Compound Manager 
establish a rapport with the workers. Besides the Induna, the 
Compound Manager relied on other channels for keeping in touch 
wi th the WOI-kers. The "pol ice boys" were also important sources 
of information. Several interviews revealed that informers were 
a common feature of compound life and played a very important 
role in assisting mine management. These informers did not 
resemble the notorious informers that we know today; they were 
qenerally not paid nor were they formally instructed to spy on 
the workers. They often volunteered information to the Compound 
Manager in an attempt to prevent problems i~ a particular area. 
In the words of a Mine Manaqer: 
• These informers would "pick up vibes" and feel that they 
had to speak to someone ln authorlty to "drop a whisper" so 
that management could investigate and take the correct 
action before anything major happened'. (69) 
This sect iOIl has n~vealed the complexi t les tj'f control on the 
collieries. The rigid system of control over the workforce did 
not amount to total domination. The authorIty of both the 
Compound Manaqer and the Induna was circumscribed in very real 
ways; if they embarked upon an unfavourable COU~5e of action ln 
the compound, they would be rejected by the workers. A dynamic 
process of interaction between the formal conditions of existence 
and the needs and perceptions of the workforce, was the status 
qLI(). 
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strike action on the collieries has possibly been underplayed in 
South Africa historical writings, because of the short nature of 
the str 1kes. There was no equ i valent of tt ... e 1946 Gold Minet~s 
. 
Strike on the colliet-ies. None-the-less workers aptly pOinted out 
that: 
'You see a strike is not a thing of just one day that it 
starts. If a mine strikes you must know that there are 
cet-tain things that have been going along and those people 
concerned did not attend to them and people become very, 
very cross. Then they say they're not going to work until 
those things are sorted out. They don't just sit in one room 
and shout, "Today we are not going to ltJor-k", ... They talk it 
over where they are working down the mine, Lhey'li talk it 
over in the changehouse, where they are going to get their 
food'. (70). 
There were several trajectories that strike action would follow. 
On an ordinary day on the mines, the the bell for the morning 
shift would go at about 4.30 a.m. Their miners would get dressed 
and take their dishes to the kitchen to get food. At 5.30a.m., 
the bell would r 1ng again to signal the stat-t or w(;t-k underground 
in half an hour. On the day that there was a strike however: 
'The bell will ring at 4.30 and no one will come out. They 
just get up and get dressed and stay in their rooms. No one 
is going to the kitchen to get food. (The reason for this 1s 
that) they want to be very, very croes. When a person is 
hungry, he becomes very cross - he's hungry and he's worried 
and he does not need that food until he gets a better 
treatment ... They've got a big worry to be sorted out. If 
they don't go and get their food, you must know that it is 
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hell to play'.(71) 
In virtually every report on strike action, the native 
Commissionet- or Commissioner of Police would comment on the 
workers refusal to eat the food prepared for them and thus the 
str ikes wet-e often referred to as "hunger str ikes"; 
'The native m1ne labourers of the (Greenside) Colliery went 
on hunqer stri~e and refused to eat their food before going 
down the mine on that morning'. (72) 
Beside the reasons given by the interviewee, the workers probably 
also t-efused their food in the knowledge that t!"le Mine Manager 
would not allow them to go underground without naving eaten. The 
managers painted out that without food the workers 'would 
otherwise be in danger to themselves and the rn1:1e'1 (73 as they 
would have no strength for their laborious tasks. The costs that 
the mine would have to bear if accidents occurred discouraged 
management from sending workers underground. 
After refusing to eat or go underground, the workers would gather 
outside the compound. The Mine Police or Illduna would then phone 
the Compound Manager to tell him, 'Hey'l Today it's not good', 
(74) On receivinq the news of a strike, there was a marked 
reluctance all the part of the Compound Manager concerned to 
approach the striking workers and to discover their grievances, 
When asked the reason for this, the interviewee pOinted to the 
vulnerable position that the Compound Manager and other mine 
officials were in at this stage: 
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'It's not easy, Any official won't go straight to the 
striking workers - never. They are too scared.,.On the mines 
there are thousands of people - now they are all together. 
Then the Compound Manaqer will be seared to go there. 
Perhaps he'll try and find out from the Induna or take the 
Induna and Mine Pol ice and qo there. The intel-preter says, 
"The boss wants to know what's wrong today." They'll say, 
"Go to hell. Tell the Compound Manager to go to hell." They 
tell him straight away that they want the Native 
Commissioner here'. (75) 
At the point when the workers had decided to go on strike, the 
Compound Manaqet- had lost all author i t Y in their eyes. He had 
failed to rectify the compla~nts brought before him in the 
preceding days or weeks and the workers were no longer interested 
in neqotiating with him. 'They'll say (.0 the Compound Manager, 
"You're too weak to can-y out our complaints" or "Shut upl We 
often give you complaints and you don',!: take care of it." They 
wanted the "big boss",' (76) The strikers ~ere sometimes too 
impatient to wait for the "big boss" to arrive, and they simply 
set off on a march to Witbank to find, and lodge their complaints 
wi th ei ther the Nat 1 ve Commissioner or' in the case of the 
Portuguese workers, with the Portuguese Inspector at the WNLA 
Compound. 
The above points explain why the Native Commissioner of Witbank 
was a ubiqu i tous f igu!-e dur ing str ike ~.ct ion and why he was 
always called onto the scene of a strike. His role 1s an 
interesting and complex one. On the one hand, he was regarded by 
the workers as the only person who could grant their demands. 
From manaqement's perspective on the other hand, he was the only 
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one who would placate the workforce and restore order on the 
mine. It is remarkable that the mine management itself did not 
have the machinery to solve their own pt-oblems. They had to rely 
on outside help in a time of crisis, a state of affairs which 
suggests the workers' potential power. 
Once on the mine, the Native Commissioner functioned as a kind 
of "mediator" between management and the strikers, attempting to 
. 
investigate the 'workers' complaints while ensuring that they 
returned to work as soon as possible. He cannot be portrayed as 
a figure who "sided with the workers" in their decision to 
strike. Several recurrent themes are discernible in the addresses 
made by the Native Commissioner to striklng workers marking his 
disapproval of their actions. 
On legal grounds, he warned the "natives" that they were 
contravening the law by refusing to go to work and that they were 
liable to be prosecuted. On moral q,ounds, the Native 
Commissioner reprimanded the workers for what he considered to be 
their 'high handed action of going on strike without first 
appOinting a deputation to lay their grievances before the mine 
management or failing satisfaction from their management then to 
theit- inspector' (77). This statement was made dur ing a str ike at 
Clydesdale Colliery. A further example which reiterates both 
these themes was the Native Commissioner's address to a meeting 
during a strike at Landau Colliery in 1944: 
'r pointed out to the Natives the wrongful and unlawful 
action taken by them in ceasing work and going on strike, 
and warned them of the very grave consequences to them if 
such conduct was repeated. They were also informed that if 
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they had any complaints or grievances, their proper course 
was to appoint a delegation to interview me on such matters 
which would then receive official inves~i9ation·. (78) 
One may ascertain from these examples that, from the management's 
perspective, strike action was the first resort for the black 
miners. The previous sections would seem to invalidate this 
claim; workers more often than not felt that formal channels for 
airing grievances, ,such as through the Compound Manager, did not 
. 
prove efficacious. The workers were unmoved by the Native 
Commissioner's threats of prosecution. 
It should be noted that the emergency regulations during the war 
provided the punishment of a fine of 900 pounds or three years 
imprisonment witll hard labour for persons striking work on the 
mines. Durinq the first half of the 40's the Native Commissioner 
regularly reminded the workers of the tcrlme being committed by 
their g01nq on strike during war time and also of the severe 
penalty for such a crime and therefore advised them to go back to 
work and to appoint one or more of themselves as delegates to 
discuss the rna t ter with the mine management. ~ (79) These war--t ime 
tequlations appeared to have little impact on the action of the 
wot-ket-s, Ilowevel-. The Native Commissioner on Tweefontein Colliery 
r-eminded the wot-kers of this regulation but, 
'This still had no apparent effect as the Natives refused to 
resume work unless their demands regarding the Chief 
Compound Manager and Mine Captain to which the General 
Manaqer was not prepared to accede to were complied with. 
and the meeting was terminated in order to give the Natives 
a further opportunity of coming to a favourable 
decision ... '. (80) 
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Although the stoppages of work were illegal, the Native 
Commissioner often recommended that no action be taken in the 
matter. This was indicative of th~ Native Commissioner's attempts 
to win over the striking workers. Thus, despite his warnings, 
the Native Commissioner gave the workers a sympathetic hearing 
and treated their complaints with an apparent fairness and 
neutrality. Albert Simelane explained this such a way that the 
unnerving power of a group of strikers was well demonstrated: 
'TIle Native Commissioner will talk to them nicely he 
promises to talk to the Mine Manager .to attend to their 
. i 
complaints ... (He'll say) "I'm asking you politely, tomorrow 
you must go to work", he'll never shout. When people are 
many and when they are cross, when there's a strike, they 
can kill you. It's no use getting cheeky ... '. (Bl) 
There are very few occasions when he did not suggest that the 
management accede to worker's demands. Upon investigation he 
often found the workers complaints to be valid as was shown in 
tIle case of several complaints lodged against Compound Managers. 
On one occasion, he went so far as to cite the conditions in the 
compounds as the cause o~ the disturbances: 
'Conditions are not as they should be in the compound ... the 
rooms are not free of vermin and although I am assured that 
DIT is being used extensively, I have had occasion to 
complain about tl1e vermin on more than one occasion. A close 
watch is being kept in this connection. These facts are 
mentioned in the report because I am of the opinion that 
(they) contribute to the discontent of the natives in the 
compound. The labourers, it would appear are called on to 
work hard, and, if they are not fully content in the 
compound, the slightest matter will upset them'. (82) 
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lhe Native Commissioner's acquiescence to the workers can be read 
as a genuine response to the situation at hand. It can also be 
read as simply a pragmatic response, the only one which would 
resolve the strike. The workers were seldom satisfied or prepared 
to return to work unless their demands were met and they did not 
respond well to threats from management. Moreover, it was in the 
Commissioner-'s interests to restore the peace. 
In many instances it was reported that <the Natives behaved in an 
orderly manner and no untoward incidents occurred' (83). 
However, not all strikes were peaceful and some resulted in 
violent action on the part of both workers and police. An example 
of such a trajectory was the course that strike action took at 
Schoollgezicht Colliery in 1945: 
<About 5.30pm on the 2nd instant the Natives of Rooms Nos. 
13, 14 and 15 rushed out prevented the boys who were going 
on night shift from having their food rations and threatened 
to kill them if they attempted to take their rations. The 
workers coming off day shift boys wet-e a.lso stopped from 
taking their food. All these Natives then joined in a crowd. 
They ~mashed up the compound Manager's office, the quarters 
of the Mine Police, as well as the tradin9 store adjoining 
the compound. Without giving any reason for their behaviour 
the crowd of natives then marched onto the WNLA Compound, 
Witbank. En route they stoned a car causing serious damage. 
The police went out to meet them. They seemed very hostile 
and in order to stem their activities the polIce fired 4-5 
shots wounding one native in the hand and the other in the 
leg. Another party of police arrived and managed to subdue 
the natives ... Police investigations are geared towards 
charging the natives with public violence. 1 243 Natives out 
of a total of 1 620 workers were involved'. (84) 
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In this example, the damage to property amounted to 770 pounds 
which was a fairly substantial amount in the 1940's. Ninety four 
workers were arrested, 82 of whom were convicted. During 
confrontations with the polIce, 33 strikers were injured - 3 by 
shooting and the others by batons and bayonets. 
Often, the management would cite a particular indivIdual or group 
of individuals as-the cause of strike action and they were then 
discharged. In some cases it was intimidation that drove workers 
to strike: 
'I am employed by the Abor Collieries ... l am O~ the tipping 
tubs. 1 have been employed by the company only two we~ks 
ago.l had not known much about it. I went on strike because 
of the threat of assault of the strikers if I did not go on 
strike as well'. (85) 
The Native Commissioner's words on the role of the police during 
disturbances at Dogies Colliery are demonstrative of the general 
attitude of the management to The South African Police in these 
matters. They were generally called upon 'just in case' and 
offered the management of sense a security Wililst dealing with 
the strikers: 
'Needless to say, the Police were always kept on the spot, 
although they remained in the background during the various 
addresses delivered to the strikers'. (86) 
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Thus the police would often proceed to a mine but no action was 
taken by them. 
The numbers involved in strike action varied greatly. The largest 
number of striking workers in this period was approximately 1 720 
during a strike at Transvaal and Delagoa Say Colliery in 1945. 
The total labour force on that mine was 1 732 which meant that 
virtually every worker was on strike. In 1941 on Navigation 
. 
Colliery 1 000 out of roughly 1 500 workers went on strike and in 
1944 1 200 went on strike on the same mine. The figures of 
striking workers on Schoongezight in 1945 were also very high. 1 
243 workers out of 1 620 did not go underground. III the same year 
75 out of some 500 workers at Douglas Colliery went on strike. 
(87).These figures demonstrate that in certain instances the 
majority of the workforce was mobilised aroulld strike activity. 
The fact that there were a number of consistent features dut-ing 
collective action on the mines pOints to the existence of some 
type of system of rUles, informal or otherWise, that was 
operating between workers and management on the mines. Moodie has 
used the term "moral economy' to encapsulate this system. 
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• 
Within the moral economy, workers were able to wield a 
significant amount of power over mine management as witnessed in 
their frequent success in getting a Compound ManQger or Induna 
retrenched or re-installed. So pervasive and powerful 
fpatures that caused discontent among migrants, 
were the 
that the 
manaqpments' most ft-equent nostrum was to acceed to workers' 
demands. The type of power that was asserted here by the workers 
obviously had severe limitations, but it did succeed in forcing 
manaqement to comply with their wiShes which in turn served to 
cushion the effects of the harsh world that the miners 
inhabited. 
Often a specific issue, such as the quality of foea, would be the 
direct cause of the strike but it would itl turn give rise to 
complaints over a series of issues which might otherwise have 
remained une><posed. There was thus a kind of "snOW-ball" effect 
during these disturbances as accumulated grievances came to the 
fOI-e. 
There is very little evidence of broader aims being fought for 
durinq collective action. The moral economy gave rise to 
drfcnsive actions that were restricted in both time and place. 
Demands were almost always practical in nature and could be dealt 
with effectively in a short space of time. Ther'e was no formal 
orqarlisation during strike action. The rise of the African Mine 
Workers Union, which was launched in 1941 under the leadership of 
J . B. Marks and wl~ich was to become the ma,jor f ol-ce behind the 
1946 black miners strike on ttle gold mines, had little impact on 
the coal mines in the period under investigation. 
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There are divisions among sociologists and historians as to 
whether the workers' strike action on the collieries could or 
could not be said to reflect a worker consciousness. The one 
school of thought is represented by Melvyn Goldberg. He asserts 
that. despi te the fact that the workers demonstrated an awat-eness 
of and antaqonism to their subordination by challenging the 
discriminatory practices of white officialdom and displaying 
little hesitation in refusing to go underground, their actions 
did not reflect a worker consciousness. According to this 
definition the fact that there was no sense of workers' rights 
OV8r and above indigenous moral outrage makes it diffficult to 
desc, ibe their actions as displaying "wor-ket- consciousness". 
t1ot-eovet- the lack of formal organisational structures with a 
recognised leadership to guide the actions of the workers during 
a strike would also militate against describing their protests in 
such terms. 
The second school of thought has a much more dif~use definition 
of worker consciousness. According to Phimister and van Onselen 
formal orqanisation should not be considered the sign post of a 
worker consciousness. A vat-iet y 0 f fot-ms 0 f worker- pt-otest 
ranqinq from machine breaking to desertions, can be described as 
demonstrations of worker consciousness. Within this framework the 
strike action on the collieries would undoubtedly 
expression of worker consciousness. 
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be an 
It is impossible to investigate the issue of worker corlsciousness 
in any detail. However, evidence would seem to suggest that the 
consciousness of the workers was still largely rooted in the 
countryside and that their protests were not economic responses 
to exploitation within an industrial setting but moral outcries 
aqainst conditions which affected the day-to-day life of the 
miners. The following section will explore these issues in 
qreater depth. 
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CHAPTER TWO:_MIGRANTS AND ETHNICITY 
The notion of the moral economy on the mines provides a useful 
framework in which the informal power relationships operating on 
the mines can be understood. The concept allows for a more 
flexible interpretation of managerial control, as it shows that 
the workers possess limited, but none-the-less importa~t, means 
of negotiating the terms of their existence. It has been shown in 
Chapter 1 that while on the whole the workers acquiasced to 
supervisory demands because they saw no real a'!ternatives, there 
were certain areas in which the workers exercisad real power. 
Despi te the e 1 uc i datory va 1 ue of the concept, it has, h'Jwever, 
several short comings. The concept of the moral economy tends 
towards reification in that it foregrounds the structural aspects 
of mining life. It attempts to understand the specific pattern of 
the workers' organisation, through an investig~tion of the 
relationship set up between the workers and the Compound Manager, 
Induna etc. This analysis of the internal structure of the 
relationships on the mine and in the compound fails to consider 
• the importance that a group of migrants' particular background 
had in influencing their actions. The miners w&re not mere tabula 
rasa onto which the moral economy was inscribed ... They did not 
leave behind the countryside when they journeyed to the mines; 
their rural consciousness was deeply internalised a~d was not 
automatically negated by their presence on the mines. Thus the 
migrants brought with them their own set of cultural Clssl.!mptions l 
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practices and forms of associations. The strong rural orientation 
of the migrant workforce functioned as an important pillar for 
the workers on the collieries. Their responses to their new 
situation was partially determined by this deeply ingrained set 
of values and expectations. 
Thus, while the notion of a moral economy adequately captures 
certain aspects of the nature and causes of collective action, it 
fails to incorporate others. One of the "missing elements" within 
the concept can be understood as pertaining to mining culture or 
the "ethnic dimension" of resistance on the collieries. Jeff Guy, 
in his study on shaft sinking on the gold mines, points to the 
importance of this dimension of study by attempting to link 'the 
intensely personal perception of labour on the mines and the 
impersonal forces that shape the work experience' (1). Workers on 
the mines were not an homogeneous group. As already mentioned, 
the coal mining industry in the Transvaal was almost entirely 
dependent on migrant labour. This phenomenon was spawned by a 
government policy which aimed at prohibiting the establishment of 
permanent places for black workers in urban or industrial 
centres. The workers came from a number of different areas both 
inside and outside the borders of South Africa. Their ethnic 
identities remained integral to their lives on the mines; a 
worker's ethnic identity determined the job he occupied, the room 
he lived in, how and with whom he spent his leisure time. There 
were few activities that were not underpinned by these ethnic 
divisions. 
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Evidence also strongly suggests that during strikes worker 
participation was sectional in nature. In other words, action 
occurred amongst a specific group of workers. There is little 
evidence to show that, on an overt level, the divisiofl of workers 
occurred along lines other than that of ethnicity - workers were 
seldom united by their specific job categories or common 
grievances. Rather, reports on strike action on collieries are 
littered with ethnic references and a particular "tribe" was 
often cited as the cause of a strike. Moreover, in every 
interview situation, ethnicity featured as a primary concern in 
discussions dealing with labour relations. The primary divisions 
and tensions undoubtedly arose between the East Coast and the 
Basotho workers. Ethnicity appears to have been a key organising 
principle on the mines. It is pertinent to inquire therefore into 
the different ways in which the ethnic composition of the 
workforce was reflected in the general context of mining life and 
in the specific area of strike action. For the purposes of this 
chapter, ethnic divisions and tensions will be explored in three 
distinct areas. Firstly, the ways in which ethnic divisions were 
manifest on a day-to-day level. Secondly, how a marked feature 
during protest action was ethnic mobilisation. Lastly, how ethnic 
tensions had the potential to flare up into faction rights 
amongst workers on the collieries. As a preliminary however, 
ethnicity as a concept will be briefly explored. 
77 
A) ETHNICITY AS A FORCE ON THE MINES 
Any discussion on ethnicity needs to be framed within the 
particular contex~ in which it is evident. What becomes apparent 
within the context of mining life is the need to d1saggregate the 
concept and to understand ethnicity as a n~ulli-faceted and 
complex tool of analysis. It arises out of a multiple set of 
determinations. On the one hand, one must take into account 
ethnicity's material basis, that is, its roots in the particular 
social formation from where the migrant came. The workers clearly 
displayed an ethnic consciousness on arriving on the mines and 
their ethnic identity cannot therefore be seen as simply the 
"creation" of mine management. On the other hand, management 
placed migrants in contexts which magnified the extent to which 
they experienced their own ethnic identities. They were housed in 
compounds where all resources were allocated on an ethnic basis 
and where the persistence of ethnic divisions was encouraged at 
all times. The worker's own sense of ethnic identity and the 
management's manipulation of this identity was the crucial 
combination in fuelling the flames of ethnic conflict. 
In hostels where there were no prescribed ethnic divisions, 
there is virtually no evidence of faction fights occurring during 
the same period of study. Within the mining world, the management 
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ignored their culpability in spawning ethnic conflict. They 
propagated a jejune theory of ethnicity - they simply regarded 
ethnicity and conflict as close relatives. In reality, they are 
often distant cousins. It needs to be stressed therefore that an 
ethnic consciousness is not necessarily the springboard for 
inter-ethnic rivalTY or faction fights. It has greater potential 
to become such a springboard however, if it is overlaid by a 
structure of control that itself entr"enches ethnic barriers. The 
compound was the quintessential example of such a structure of 
control. 
Changing patterns of recruitment we~e an additional factor in 
fuelling ethnic conflict. A change in the ethnic composition of 
the workforce affected the balance of power in the compounds as 
well as exacerbating the constant jostling for positions amongst 
the workforce and competing for access to scarce resources. It 
will be shown that during the 1930's and 1940's, there were 
substantial changes in the composition of the workforce on the 
collieries and this in part underpinned the increase in ethnic 
tensions and faction fights during the decade of the 1940's. Some 
of the findings in relation to recruitment are speculative as 
there were not always detailed figures to back up what appears to 
have been noticeable trends in patterns of recruitment. 
The labour requirements on the coal mines were relatively modest 
in comparison to those on the gold mines. In 1936, the average 
number of "Natives" employed by the Witwatersrand Native labour 
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Association (WNLA) during 1936 was 291 213 on the Witwatersrand 
Gold Mines while the coal mines in the same period employed only 
14 804 workers. By 1942, the numbers employed had increased to 
353 086 and 21103 respectively (2). Labour requirements on the 
collieries however mushroomed with the significant increase in 
the demand for coal from 1939 onwards. 'Owing to the war the 
importance of the Coal Mining Industry in relation to the 
National economy, . has increased and the Industry has been called 
upon not only to maintain but to increase production'(3). During 
the year 1940 the coal produced in the Union amounted to 18933 
000 tons, an increase of 767 000 tons over the 1939 production 
(4). In 1942, the Native Labour association arranged for the 
additional supply of!Native labour to be sent to the Transvaal 
Collieries and by 1944 the coal output in the Transvaal alone 
amounted, to 16 740 009' (5). 
The development of the coal industry outstripped the growth of 
labour available and often acute labour shortages were 
experienced by the collieries. Even before the boom in coal, the 
Government Mining Engineer warned that !the shortage of native 
labour is very serious today, that it threatens to become more 
serious in the future and that it will undoubtedly affect the 
development of the mineral industry adversely unless immediate 
steps are taken to improve the situation' (6). 
Labour from Portuguese East Africa was vitally important to both 
the gold and coal mines. This was especially true of the coal 
mines where the majority of workers, particularly in the 1920s 
and 1930s, were Shanganes, East Coasters, from Portuguese East 
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Africa. This source of labour was not simply "available" to the 
mines. The number of labourers entering South Africa from 
Mozambique was formally controlled by the Mozambique Convention 
of 1928 which limited the number of workers that could be 
recruited in Portuguese East Africa. The Convention stated that, 
tThe maximum number of Portuguese Natives that may be 
employed on the mines is fixed at 80000. (7) 
There was a provision in the Convention however, for an increase 
in the maximum if the Native labour available in Mozambique 
exceeded the tnumber necessary for the requirements of the 
Province' (8). This provision was acted upon in 1936 when the 
Portuguese Government extended the maximum number of labourers 
that could be recruited to 90 000 saying that tthe large number 
of Portuguese Natives making their way to other parts of the 
Union ... would appear to indicate that there is still a surplus of 
Native labour in Mozambique which could be made available to the 
mines' (9). This was supposedly reflected in the high number of 
clandestine emigrations of Mozambique labourers to the Union. The 
convention further stipulated that no labourer shall tbe engaged 
in the first instance for a period longer than one year, but at 
the end of the first period he may be re-engaged for a further 
period or periods, but so that such period or periods do not ... 
exceed two years' (10). Thereafter, they would be regarded as 
"prohibited immigrants". The Portuguese East African worker who 
returned from the mines was required by the Convention to stay at 
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home for six months. The Portuguese Curator in Witbank had the 
task of attempting to ensure that these various clauses were 
carried out. In practice however, it is unlikely that the workers 
obeyed the letter of the law. They had often entered the union 
illegally and the one Shangane worker interviewed for this study 
never returned to Mozambique (11). Most of the labourers on the 
coal mines from Portuguese East Africa stayed on the mines for a 
minimum of one year. As a result of this usually lengthy period 
of employment, their practices on the mines were prone to differ 
from groups of labourers who were on the mines for a couple of 
months at a time. 
In 1938, the Portuguese Government withdrew its permission for 
the Union to recruit up to 90 000 workers. This reduction in the 
size of Portuguese labour force affected both the gold mines and 
the collieries. To compensate for the reduction in Portuguese 
East Africans, the mines had to look to the (possibility of 
obtaining the additional Natives from Union and Protectorate 
sources ... or from areas north of the 22'S latitude' (12). 
The Chamber of Mines referred to workers that were recruited from 
inside South Africa as "British South African Natives", and the 
Mining Industry was not restricted to any maximum numbers which 
it could draw from the Union and the Protectorates. However, the 
reports reflect that the "British South African Natives" were not 
that easy to "obtain" as 'they were not so favourabiy inclined 
towards mining employment as others' (13). The migrancy of groups 
like the Pedi was largely "voluntary" in nature (14). In order to 
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attract "South African Natives" to the mines, the Chamber 
embarked on a propaganda programme, one prong of ~hich was a 
propaganda fi 1m used for recruiting purposes. The ~dvent of the 
war made the Chamber's task more difficult. The mines suffered 
because of the 'heavy demand for N.::tive labour for mil itary 
purposes' (15). From the Magl~terial district of Sekhukuneland 
alone '1622 (Pedi) ~~n enlisted and considerable numbers were 
recruited from adjoining areas, in the first few months of the 
war eH:::"rt' (16). 
The a~ai1ability of "British South African Natives q on the labour 
market was also governed by the factors internal to a particular 
society. Agricultural factors played a significant role in 
influencing the numbers of people who sought jobs on the mines. 
When there were no droughts and harvests were successful, labour 
was generally not forthcoming. 
A combination of factors in the 30's forced Basotho workers from 
Basotho1and and Pedi workers from the Northern Transvaal to enter 
the labour force on the collieries in greater numbers. Reports 
on the strikes indicate that the management tended to lump these 
two groupings of workers together under the appeilation 
Sotho (17). Prior to the 1930's, the majority of Pedi migrants 
worked on the Premier diamond mines. During the depression in the 
early 1930's, these diamond fields were forced to shut down. 
There was a tendency for Pedi youth to seek alternative 
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employment on the collieries. Despite the poor conditions on the 
collieries, they were very close to Sekhukuneland and were thus 
were very convenient places of employment for the Ped; worker. 
The younger men were within striking distance of their homes. 
Reports indicate that there were large clusters of Pedi workers 
on specific collieries by the 1940's. The Anglo-French, 00g1es 
and Greenside Collieries all had high percentages of Pedi 
workers. In 1945, a report 011 strike action at the Transvaal and 
Delagoa Bay Colliery revealed that 670 out of 1732 workers were 
Ped1 workers (18). The Chamber's recruitment drive in the late 
30's, the increased coal output, and a series of droughts that 
ravished the country in 1938 and 1939 also ensured that this 
grouping of workers were more amenable to the mines for labour 
purposes. 
It seems likely that the movement of Basotho onto the collieries 
can also be linked to the closing of the diamond mines during the 
depression. This does not however explain their large and 
increasing presence towards the end of the 1930's. They were 
predominant on certain mines by the 1940's, for example, on 
Navigation Colliery which was the largest in the Witbank 
district. 
A far smaller percentage of the workforce on the collieries was 
made up of Xhosa speakers from the Cape, Zulu speakers from Natal 
and Swazi speakers from Swaziland. Recruitment drives in those 
areas were geared towards attracting labour to the gold mines. 
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Most of the Xhosa, Zulu and Swazi labour were "voluntary" in the 
sense that they were not channeled through recruiting 
organisations. Interview material also indicates that some of the 
workers arriving on the collieries in the 1940's had been 
transferred there from the gold or other mines. Elijah Shangwe 
was an example of this phenomenon. He had been transferred there 
. 
from the Black Diamond Mine in Breyten. 
From the beginnings of the migrant labour system, it is possible 
to detect a pattern being established among migrants entering 
into jobs on the mines on the Rand - the majority of workers on a 
particular gold mine or colliery would belong to a particular 
ethnic group. There was a proclivity for workers from a specific 
region to seek work and congregate in a particular workplace or 
area of employment. Local gossip served to familiarise potential 
workers with the conditions and opportunities on a particular 
mine. A system that developed among East Coasters was that they 
would contact fellow workers in their home town just before their 
own contracts expired (19). These workers would then arrive at 
the mine in time to take over the jobs that were being vacated. 
In this way jobs rotated through a group of people who were 
connected to each other by their place of origin. Delius recorded 
that the Pedi migrants from Sekhukunelandtstuck together both en 
route to work and where possible at their places of employment'. 
Recent South African historiography has focused on the 
timportance and tenacity of these "ethnic" patterns of migration' 
(20). These writings have challenged the tendency in South 
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African literature to see ethnicity as the product of 
manipulation by mine managers or as the result of the 
government's apartheid policies, which then ignored the internal 
dynamics of ethnic association. Ethnically based networks on the 
mines had very important functions and were part of the survival 
tactics developed by migrant workers. They helped m~grant workers 
retain their contact with home and they offered migrants support 
and protection whilst they were living far from home in a harsh 
working and living onvironment. Such networks also facilitated 
defensive actions by workers in the workplace and were thus 
important in patterns both of control 
outside the compound. These factors 
and prot8st 
partially 
inside 
explain 
and 
why 
ethnicity played an important part in shaping a migrant's 
consciousness. They reinforce the opinion expressed above, namely 
that ethnicity has to be viewed from two distinct vantage points. 
The first vantage point shows that ethnicity was not necessarily 
an artificial imposition of the management structure on the mines 
but was integral in the lives of the workers. The seccnd vantage 
point suggests that the migrants' ethnic consciousness was 
further reinforced and capitalised on by marlagement. Ethnic 
terlsions were unscrupulously manipulated to management's 
advantages, especially in attempting to preclude the potential 
of united working class action. 
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B) ~THNIC DIVISIONS IN THE DAILY LIFE OF THE WORKERS. 
Interviews revealed that ethnic stereotyping was a ubiquitous 
feature of life on the mines. In the minds of management and 
workers alike, the workforce was divided and categorised 
throughan elaborate system of ethnic labelling. Each label had a 
distinct image and moral content attached to it. Although 
stereotypes, like all commonsense maxims, contain elements of 
truth, they are to be treated circumspectly as they cannot be 
taken at face value. They are not anchored in any systematic 
empirical reality and serve to produce a trite mythology of a 
group's particular characteristics. Often a stereotype will arise 
out of a specific set of conditions at a particular juncture, but 
will continue even though that "reality" has changed. One the 
mines, the stereotypes that were historically relevant persisted 
over time through a process of consolidation. 
On the mines the stereotyping occurred within a very particular 
context and can be seen as partially arising out of the nature 
and structure of the mine world. The white person's stereotype of 
black miners can be located within what Gordon in Mines, Masters 
and Management refers to as a "supervisory ideology". What became 
known as Verwoerdian separatist ideology was already well 
entrenched on the mines in the 1940's. Whites could not form any 
close relationships with black workers without the threat of 
81 
being called a "kaffir boetie". There was no overlap in leisure 
activities between black and white miners and virtually the only 
contact between these groupings was in the workplace. Although 
this does not necessarily invalidate the white miner's 
perceptions of ethnic differences and divisions, it does point to 
their superficial nature. Moeover, it should be understood that 
manageme'nt used and manipulated stereotypes as a way of 
motivating the workforce. The stereotype of a particular group of 
workers being the "best labourers" not only instilled a sense of 
pride and sometimes superiority amongst that grouping, but also 
facilitated a competitive spirit amongst workers which in turn, 
facilitated increased production. In this way, ethnicity was 
"functional" to capital and the advantages of organising the 
workforce around perceptions of ethnicity outweighed the 
disadvantages of potential ethnic conflict. 
The black miners' stereotyping was formulated in a world in 
which, as already indicated, divisions were partially preordained 
by the fact that the workers arrived on the mines from many 
different parts of the country. The different backgrounds of the 
workers opened the way for stereotyping to take place. Moreover, 
the encouragement of ethnic divisions by the structural factors 
of the compound enhanced the probability of stereotyping. Guy 
presents a useful explanation of why stereotyping took place 
amongst Sasotho migrant workers on the gold mines. 
(It would appear that, in a situation of tremendous labour 
oppression and the suppression of the more formal types of 
worker organisation, then the propagation of ethnic 
stereotypes by workers themselves, and the mobilisation of 
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Basotho (and other groupings) around them, was a means of 
protection, a qualified form of work satisfaction, and above 
all, a means of securing a greater income'. 21 
Workers who worked long contracts and who formed distinct 
communities on ttle mines were also more prone to ethnic 
stereotyping. Management's stereotyping of the workforce was 
often corroborated by the workers and the stereotypes came to be 
internalised and subjectively experienced. 
It is interesting to note that with the rise of the trade union 
movement and management's attempts to rationalise the labour 
process, overt ethnic stereotyping was no longer as prominent a 
feature on mines. Management dismissed perceptions of ethnicity 
as "irrational". tThe attempt to create a more rational labour 
structure has left little room for these biased notions' (22). 
Moreover, the union leadership is not ethnically based and the 
union practices encourage a shift away from specific cultural 
forms of organisation. 
In the 1940's, ethnic stereotyping was reflected in both 
character assessments and the suitability of an ethnic group for 
a particular job. Commenting on the ethnic tensions on the 
mines, a Compound Manager spoke of the differences between East 
Coasters and Basotho labourers. The East Coast workers 
ttended to lean to the more skilled work and had a general 
mechanical aptitude and an ability to learn quickly. The 
East Coast labourers filled "semi-skilled" positions such as 
pipe fitters, track layers, coal cutters and ventilation 
pipe installers. As "aliens" or foreigners who were in 
particularly vulnerable positions on the mines, they were 
far more amenable to the autocratic structure of the 
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management and were prepared to put up with it to a greater 
extent that the Basuto'. (23) 
These perceptions on the nature of the Shangane workforce, 
particularly in relationship to their amenability to the 
management structure, were reinforced in an interview with a Mine 
Manager from Kromdraai-Coronation Colliery: 
'Shanganes as a people are extremely industrious. They were 
referred to as the "black Jews" of the collieries because 
they were able to get themselves organised in the 
community ... They sorted our how to get Lhe best jobs and 
positions on the collieries and adapted very easily in the 
same way as the Jewish community did when they came to South 
Africa. The net result was that they were more pliable, more 
amenable to discipline. They took the trouble to learn to 
understand the employer. They were in tune with working with 
whites and therefore wound up in the most senior 
positions ... (mostly) as the boss boys.' (24) 
It is simplistic to suppose that the Shanganes were, by nature, 
"more pliable" and "amenable to discipline". A Swazi worker's 
comments on the Shan ganes affords one a deeper understanding as 
to why this grouping appeared more pliable and why they were the 
ones occupying the more skilled positions. The Shanganes were 
initially the majority and the "big people on the mines" 
' ... because they came here (to the collieries) on contract, 
what they call "join". Where they came from in Portuguese 
East Africa, they had labour offices that sent them to the 
mines. Since they came here on contract, there was nothing 
they could do ... they could not choose jobs for themselves. 
They were told that they had to work underground. They just 
go underground whether he's afraid or not ... If you don't go 
down, you have to turn back ... Workers from South Africa were 
not on join and couldn't be forced (to go underground).'(25) 
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The "join" system also partially explained why the Shanganes 
occupied the more skilled positions. 
fIt is true they had skills because they were oppressed in 
the job ... When they came on contract, there was no surface 
job for them ... The only job they could do was underground -
that is why they obtained more skills than the people from 
South Africa. They worked under pressure and it was easier 
for them to acquire skills'. (26) 
Elijah Shangwe echoed the Manager's theme that the Shanganes were 
industrious workers but again saw this as a result of their 
position as foreigners. In his opinion the Shanganes 
were very important on the mines. They had the mine at 
their fingertips. If on a mine there were no Shanganes, then 
that mine would close. If there were a lot of Shanganes, 
they'll get very good production work ... They were brought to 
the mines because there was no work where they came from in 
Portuguese East Africa. That is why they worked very hard on 
the mines'. (27) 
For the Shanganes, the contract system literally'shackled them to 
servitude' (28). Elijah Shangwe continued by emphasising the fact 
that they were not a "troublesome nation". Although there were 
several different groupings from Portuguese ES3t Africa - the 
Shanganes, the Machopis, the Macoca - they behaved as "one unit". 
The prototypical characterisation of the Basotho among managers 
and workers alike was that they were far more adverserial and 
confrontational personalities. In comparison with the Shanganes, 
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the Basotho appeared less flexible in their approach to mine 
life. Their later entrance onto the mines was probably a factor 
contributing to their more bellicose approach. Commenting on this 
group of workers, a Mine Manager spoke of the Basotho in the 40's 
as people who, 
'refused to try and learn Fanagalo or English and Afrikaans 
- they spoke Basotho ... They tended to be more aggressive but 
probably it was the fact that they were not amenable to 
speaking anything other than Sesuto'. (29) 
The aggressive spirit of the Basotho was equally the perception 
amongst the workers. The quote points directly to the distinction 
made between Transvaal Sotho, the Pedi, and aasotho from 
Basotholand: 
Or, 
'The Basothos are the ones who like to fight. Basothos are 
very aggressive. The Shan ganes can stay (in a room with) the 
Bapedi - there's no problem. But they cannot stay ... with 
the Basotho. Sothos like to swear, jo! Just pick a small 
thing and they make it a big fight; that's their culture'. 
(30) 
'The Basotho were seen as being far more self assertive in 
terms of their self-perception and perception of their 
manhood that is entrenched in their tribal structure.' (31) 
On a practical level, the Basotho were distinguished from other 
groupings by their physical prowess. As a result of their 
strength, the Basotho were prone to do the more arduous work on 
the mines,at which they excelled. They were "the loaders" which 
as already indicated, involved loading ore manually with a shovel 
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into tramming cars or "ngo10vane" as they w~re referr~d to by the 
workers. A loading team, which consisted of two people, was 
expected to load 50 tons of coal per day. Once the tubs were 
loaded, the team would push them along the tracks to the central 
overhaul age system to be taken to the surface. A loaded tub 
weighed about a ton and a half and these tubs were often pushed 
up adverse gradients. The Basotho loaders jealously guarded their 
jobs not only because loading was proof of their manhood, 
physical capability and superiority, but also because it was the 
most lucrative job on the mines. Workers would get paid extra for 
each "ngo1ovane" that exceeded the 50 ton quota. Besides trying 
to load as many tons of coal as possible, the loaders also strove 
to complete the task in the shortest time possible as they would 
then be free for the rest of the day. The Sasotho easily 
surpassed the required daily quota and who were often the first 
to return to the surface. Management heralded the Sasotho as the 
strongest workers on the mines. Although it is easier for 
management to 'romanticise hard physical work'(32), oral 
testimony confirmed management's perceptions. A worker recalled 
that 
'When the Sasotho came on the mine, they didn't want any 
other job - only that loading job. The Shanganes, they liked 
loading but they used to be very weak. They used to load one 
ngo1ovane for the Sasutos 'two'. (33) 
The stereotype of the Sasotho as workers with great physical 
strength was definitely not confined to the coal mines. On the 
gold mines, the Sasotho were the shaft sinkers, a very strenuous 
job. 
'The Basotho are very strong people at work ... When they sink 
a shaft you'll not find any other people there - you'll 
always find that the only people there are Basotho ... '. (34) 
In instances where East Coast labourers were employed in 
positions of loaders, they were often not given the same wages as 
the Basotho. This featured as a grievance during a strike on 
Clydesdale Colliery when the East Coasters articulated their 
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discontent over the fact that'the Portuguese boys are paid a flat 
rate of 2pounds 15shillings per ticket whereas the Basuto and 
other robust races ... earn up to 6pounds per ticket.' The 
management pointed out to them that 
'the Basotho is acclimatised and is physically strong enough 
to do at least twice the volume of manual labour that the 
Portuguese Native can do. That if the management was 
satisfied that any particular Portuguese labourer was 
capable of rendering the same service as the other races, 
the differentiation would be eliminated'. (35) 
In general however, there appeared to be little fighting 
underground over the loading job. It was recognised that the 
Basotho were superior in that line of work and as a worker at the 
time said, 'the one who loads and pushes the most, is the one who 
keeps the job' (36). 
The mine management often regarded the Basotho as the 
'clever experienced natives who have worked in other mines 
and industries and who will fight for their rights and do 
not mind embarrassing their employee.' (37) 
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Ethnic differentiation in the labour force extended far beyond 
the confines of underground and surface work and the social life 
on the mines was strongly determined by ethnic divisions. Social 
gatherings on Sundays always took place according to ethnic 
categorisations. "Moshongolo" or dancing was the most popular 
leisure time activity which occurred along strict ethnic divides. 
Joseph Mathda described how the "moshongolo" were arranged; 
tThe Shanganes are doing their tribal dances. 
Shangane dance and they do it differently. 
specialised in that gumboot dance. The Zulus 
their own tribal dancing'. (38) 
There is a 
The Bacas 
used to do 
When there were dancing competitions between the mines, the 
different ethnic groups competed with their own ethnic complement 
on another mine. The Machopi were recognised as the finest 
dancers while the Swazis, for example, twere never seen as doing 
this moshongolo because they were very few' (39). 
One miner had recollections of the Pedi miners floving to box' 
(40). It is likely that he was referring here to the Malaita 
groups, one of a variety of associations made up of Pedi 
speakers, in this case mainly Pedi youths. The form of 
organisation of the Malaita groups tshowed strong affinities with 
mosoboros organisation and culture in the countryside' (41). The 
patterns of organisation were then reshaped by the specific 
conditions on the mines and which determined the nature of the 
Malaita activities on Sundays. The most visible characteristic of 
the Malaita on the collieries was that they gathered on Sundays 
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for boxing contests. 
Ethnically based patterns of association did not only affect 
leisure time activities. They were also manifest on a loosely 
structured organisational level. When asked about the more formal 
associations on the mines, Joseph Mathda spoke of the 
impossibility of overcoming ethnic divisions to form a united 
organisation, in this case a burial society: 
tIt was very difficult. There was no ways of the different 
nations coming together. Even if one Shangane worker is late 
(dead), the Shangane workers would come together excluding 
other nations. There was no platform where we could come 
together as one'. (42) 
He went on to describe how there were sometimes separate "come-
togethers" of the different groupings: 
t ... they would go to a hall in big numbers to discuss home 
and all those things. Each and every nation was allowed to 
do that you know. Even if they were trying to throw 
something like a party for themselves, they used to do that 
just to try and keep up the spirit. They would also 
discuss the problems concerning the mine'. (43) 
These "come-togethers" cannot be described as assoc'iat ions. From 
the discussion it was difficult to ascertain if there were formal 
structural positions held by certain miners in these gatherings. 
The leaders appear to have been the various isibondas, or room 
leaders, from the rooms. 
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Speaking of ethnic associations on the mines, a miner who worked 
on Minaar Colliery in the 1940's remembered the definite presence 
of the "Marashea" or "Russians" on his mine as well as on the 
surrounding mines of Tweefont~in, Greenside and Waterpan. For 
this miner's perspective, the Basotho people were clearly 
demarcated from the rest of the miners by their association or 
participation in the activities of the Marashea. He spoke of the 
Marashea as a group who organised clandestinely and the 
predominant memory was that the Marashea were people who 
generally instilled fear amongst the rest of the miners: 
'There were many things that they used to do but you didn't 
know when they met. It was secret ... You used to see them all 
over in blankets. They were the most feared nation with 
sticks. The burning issue was that they didn1t want any 
nation to come near their womenfolk. Because of that they 
were feared. They used to fight but not so much because of 
the fear that they instilled in people. Even in the compound 
they were given their own sections. If you could say 
"Russia", they knew to whom you were referring'. (44) 
Interview material reveals the operation of ethnic associations 
and organisations on the mines during the 1940's. The extent of 
these organisations is difficult to ascertain but it is likely 
that these organisations encompassed the majority of workers who 
arrived on the mine from a particular region. There is no 
evidence that this organisations had an overt political role to 
play. They did however play an important role in unifying certain 
groups of workers during strike action on the mines as is shown 
in the following section. 
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C) THE EFFECT OF ETHNIC DIVISIONS DURING STRIKE ACTION 
strikes on the mines did not create cohesion across ethnic 
divides. Ethnicity proved a powerful force in mobilising workers, 
often serving to obscure the commonality of their interests. Thus 
the effects of ethnicity were antithetical to the formation of a 
more general working class consciousness developing among the 
workers. Reports on strikes make frequent reference to the fact 
that it was the Basotho who were striking and preventing the East 
Coast workers from returning to work or vice versa. The 
dominant trend was that the ethnic group that was in the majority 
on a particular mine were usually the initiators or participants 
in strike action. The following extracts from reports by the 
police and Native Commissioners of Witbank point to this 
tendency. During the strike at Navigation Colliery in 1941, where 
700 of the 1000 workers were Transvaal Basothos, it was 
~the Basuto who prevented the willing East Coast Natives 
from entering the compound. The East Coast Natives entered 
eventually under police protection. The Basuto scattered into 
the veld and returned by nightfall'. (45) 
And during a strike at the same colliery in 1944, the report 
revealed the ethnic divisions that split the workforce during 
strike action: 
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'The 8asutos having heard of the youths' plight in the cells 
waited in a body for the compound lights to be put out at 10 
p.m. when they rushed to the compound ceil and forced it 
open to release their youth. Their tempers having got the 
better of them they started a wholesale destruction of the 
compound office windows and also the kitchen windows. Then 
all the office furniture and records were committed to a 
fire at the entrance of the compound and burnt.' (46) 
East Coasters (EC) initiated strike action on mines where they 
were in the majority. This was the case with Schoungezicht 
Colliery (1325 EC out of 1620 workers), Douglas Colliery, (320 EC 
out of 500 workers), Transvaal and Delagoa Bay Collieries, (1004 
EC out of 1720 workers), and Tweefontein. The fcllowing quote 
demonstrate the leading role taken by East Coasters on these 
mines: 
'The two hundred Union and Swaziland Natives employed on 
this (Tweefontein) Colliery were not concerned in the 
strike. They were willing to go on shift but were unable to 
do so through fear of reprisals by the East Coast Natives, 
who are in the large majority at this colliery.' (47) 
Mobilisation during strike action 'flas cleariy lmderpinned by 
ethnic patterns of recruitment. The group that had the stronghold 
on a mine were able to assert their power while tne other groups 
were reluctant to participate in strike action. 
An interesting figure emerged during strikes in which the 
majority of the participants were Shanganes. In a discussion on 
strike action during the 40's, Joseph Mathda revealed that 'there 
was a someone, a sort of chief who was controlling all the 
Shanganes' (48). His name was Mputukezi and he came from 
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Mozambique. He was not working on the mines but had a shop in the 
old Location. That he was venerated as the Shangane people's 
leader and taken as their chief, is evident in Joseph's 
comparison of Mputukezi and Buthe1ezi. He compared them because 
Buthe1ezi is the man who 'controls all the Zulus' (49). It is 
also evident that he assumed a significantly high profile in the 
community - 'all the Shanganes were buying from his shop ... and he 
was very popular. The Whites, everyone loved him' (50). A great 
deal of Mputukezi's power was derived from the fact. that he was 
considered a person with qualifications by his fellow Shanganes -
he could speak English and Afrikaans and could read and write. It 
was believed that 'what comes from his mouth is not wrong' 
(51). It also appears that his power was derived from the part he 
played in directing workers who had arrived from Mozambique onto 
the mines: 
'Before you can get a job on any mine you must via him 
first. He will tell you that you must go to such a mine , 
they're looking for two or three people ... Ha referred them 
to the different mines where there were vacallc·jes .. ,He was 
having enough support and followers ... because he was getting 
jobs for them'. (52) 
It appears that Mputukez; 's stature in the community led to h-im 
playing an important role during strike action. He was called in 
by management to mediate in a dispute. According to Joseph, on 
all the mines where there were many Shangane workers, the 
management were 
'quite aware that there (was) someone who's got enough 
influence. If there was a problem on the mines, bosses came 
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to him with the help of township management... (They wanted 
him) to address the meeting, why there was a strike'. (53) 
According to Joseph, he was not however in cahoots with Mine 
Management. 
tIf he can say you're all dismissed ... then you're all 
dismissed. They were all afraid of him. That's why when he 
says go bac~ to work, then they all go back to work. They 
had enough confidence in him. He's not working for the 
Compound Manager'. (54) 
The existence of this chief-like figure 18 testimony to the 
workers' tendency to recreate home-based forms of association and 
organisation once they arrived on the mines. Mr.utukezi fu1fil1ed 
an important function in the lives of Mozambiquan workers. He 
played out a chiefly role and thus he1~ authority and power over 
workers from Mozambique. He is symbolic of the importance of 
ethnic loyalties and their persistence in the context of 
collective resistance on the mines. 
Strikes did not only display ethnic patterns ~f mobilisation. 
They also directly arose over ethnic issues. A warker's account 
of the strike at Landau Colliery in 1944 demonstrates precisely 
how ethnic perceptions could lead to strike action: 
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Shangane miner didn't wake up in his room. He was not 
having any relatives. They (the Management) told tne Bapedi 
to bury that particular someonA. That's how it started. Why 
must they choose the Bapedi to bury a Shangana ? They 
started hunting for the Compound Manager and Induna who had 
buried instructed them to go and bury the body ... The Induna 
managed to run away. They went to his room, burnt all the 
clothes and the bed. The hunt was then on for the Compound 
Manager. He also ran away. They decided not to go to work. 
The angerness was still with them ... They burnt the Manager's 
office - the desk and furniture were destroyed and all 
that ... '. (55) 
When asked why the Shan ganes did not participate lr1 this action, 
the worker replied that it was difficult for the Shanganes to 
'be part of it as they did not have enough information, they 
didn't know why they, (the Bapedi) were on strike, or they 
weren't consulted' (56). 
The particular nationality of' an Induna also proved to be a 
catalyst causing workers to strike. The workers' demand for an 
Induna of their own nationality may be located part.-ially in the 
authority that Indunas carried within the structure of the 
compound where Indunas were pivotal figures in maintaining 
control. It was thus important for workers e~tering into the 
alien environment of the compound, and seeking to gain access to 
the structure of authority, to be able to relate to the Induna. 
An Induna from the workers home area, who understood the customs 
and expectations of the workers and who spoke their language, was 
likely to be more accommodating and more approachable for the 
workers. Indunas would likewise favour workers belonging to their 
own ethnic group. Joseph Mathda described how "dizis" or bribes 
became part of the interaction with an Induna belonging to a 
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different ethnic group from that of the worker concerned: 
'The Induna is the one who has control of the people. If you 
want something, you must give him something a1so ... If you 
were a Shangana and the Induna was a Shangana it was easier 
to get things. But if you are of a different nation, it led 
to dizi'. (51) 
From the authority~s point of view, an Induna was expected to act 
in lieu of the tribal village headman to his subordinates. In the 
words of a Mine Manager, 'the Induna was selected from those who 
came in line with the chiefs because they carried the tribal 
authority from the homeland or territory into the compound. They 
would be the leaders of the clan or tribe or ethnic group' (58). 
Thus dissatisfaction with a particular Induna was not simply 
related to the moral economy of the compound. It was not simply a 
case of the Induna not deciding cases impartially or being blamed 
for not reporting back on the workers' complaints. The grievances 
surrounding a particular Induna were underpinned by ethnic 
variables. At mines where a particular ethnic grouping was in the 
majority, they usually had the power to insist on an Induna 
belonging to the same grouping. The changing composition of the 
workforce in the 1940's was partially reflected in the increase 
of disputes over Indunas of a particular "nationality". In 1944, 
at Navigation Colliery where the Basotho comprised the majority 
of the workforce, 
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'The Basuto ... were the ones demanding the appointment of an 
Induna of their own nationality.They had no complaints 
against the Induna but only stated that they wanted an 
Induna of their own race' (59). 
Or at Landau where the Basotho were likewise the majoritYi 
'The trouble in regard to the Induna appears to have been 
caused by the 8asuto section who rejected the appointment 
over them of an East Coast Native of which tribe the present 
Induna is a member' (60). 
While in the case of Douglas Colliery, where 320 out of 397 
workers were East Coasters, 
'The Portuguese natives demanded an Ihambane Native to be 
appointed as Chief Induna of the compound ... At the same time 
the Msutu Induna employed in the Kitchen was to be 
discharged' (61) 
The strikers usually refused to return to work unless the Induna 
in question was discharged and thus in most cases the Managers 
were forced to acquiesce to this demand. 
D) FACTION FIGHTS 
Faction fights have been the prism through which conventional 
writings have analysed the history of African workers on the 
mines. These writings have tended to interpret faction fights as 
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'the "traditional tribal animosity" that has spilled over into 
mine compounds' (62). More radical interpretations, such as those 
of van Onselen and Phiminister, have viewed faction fights as an 
'important index of working class frustration and despair' (63). 
They see faction fights as the expression of competition amongst 
workers over limited resources and 
exigencies undoubtedly created the 
job opportunities. These 
climate in which faction 
fights could arise on the collieries. At the same time, the 
faction fights were an expression of the ethnic ideology and 
sentiment that has been reflected in the previous sections as 
part and parcel of the migrants' consciousness. Ultimately, the 
faction fights were another severe impediment to the development 
of worker consciousness on the mines, as they created rifts 
amongst ethnically defined groups of workers. 
There are scattered reports of faction fights occurring amongst 
the different ethnic groupings on the collieries. 
protagonists were the Shangane and Basotho. The 
Again the main 
faction fights 
ranged from minor incidences of provocation between workers to 
fully-fledged "battles". The most serious of these was the 
faction fight that occurred between the Shanganes and Basothos on 
Oogies Navigation Colliery in 1945 in which three Basuthos were 
killed. This fight was a clear example of the extent to which 
ethnic tensions could divide the workforce and could even result 
in instances of extreme physical violence. 
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A coherent version of the affray can be extracted from the court 
case which investigated the outbreak of the factional violence. 
The testimony of a Shangane woman, sworn in front of the 
magistrate, described the circumstances of the fight; 
'The Sunday night of the fight I was at home in the mine 
location. The first thing I saw was two Shangaans pushing 
each other as though they were fighting ... It was not 
anything of a serious matter ... Then two Basutos appeared 
on the scene. (They) did not stop but were passing and as 
they did so· one of the Shangaans bumped into one of the 
Basuto ... The Msutu who was bumped into became ar.gry and 
inquired why do you bump into me? The Msutu did not become 
aggressive and start this fight. He was assaulted by No.2 
accused, who had bumped against him ... By the time they came 
to blows a crowd had not collected. I was in my house for a 
very short time and when I came out a crowd had gathered and 
there was a general fight. The crowd was made up of two 
functions (sic), Basutos and Shangaans ... Shanuaans were the 
majority and the Basutos ~Jere running away.' (64) 
The cause of the faction fight has been quoted at length to 
demonstrate how a seemingly incidental and spontaneous 
'happening' generated the series of atrocities that followed. 
This points to how the slightest provocations played into latent 
tensions and underlying hostilities among the various ethnic 
factions. The apparent slightness of the provocation needed to 
generate a faction fight is a recurrent feature in all the 
reports on the topic. (65) In this particular fight, the 
Shan ganes withdrew to the compound (where most of them lived) to 
get reinforcements and on returning to the location they began to 
break down the huts in the married quarter's. An Induna on the 
mine arrived on the scene and ordered the Basotho, ~ho at this 
point had withdrawn from the fighting, to return to the compound. 
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The Shallgones movl3d lowi'lrds t.he ~ompowld from ~.nu:-.her .jjrc~ticn. 
A rnembe r of roorn No.3 i rl the compound des~ r' -1 bed ;lO~ th." 
subsequent events unfolded; 
'lhe room was full of Basothos ... some had been drlnking 
but r~ot 1. I was asleep and awakened by otherl;in the rOOII!. 
I found the room was being attacked with s:ones. The 
Shangaans \'lere outs i de the door. (Til~y) st'iri:e<i bn:!:tk -j j~g the 
dour down ... Some of the inmstes escaped thrcug~ the window, 
but r never attempted to get away ... r saw accuted No.1 enter 
t.he roonl ... he was armed with a chopper. I watched hilli ur,til 
ha struck me ... Caswell was lying in the reom a~parently 
dead.' (66), 
It ::;hDuld ~)C !1:::tca that tho rocms v.'f)re occupierj by ,':orker's cf a 
particular gfcupin!:, in this case of Basotho wcr~ers. rhe induna 
who entered loom No.3 aftAr the this event ga~~ a dascriptive 
('ecount of the after-mati I of tile clash in the co,roPCIUf,d. 
'I found one native male lying face dcwnwards ... There was a 
pool of blood in front of his face. In th~ corner of the 
room I found another native. He was sitting on the floor and 
his head was t.erribly batt.ered and covered hI blood. This 
native was still alive.' (67) 
When the Induna left the I"oom, htl \"IRS corl f r()Il Y,p.d by ~ cro ..... rJ 
consisting of Shangflnes. His ~rttempts to re.3t.Cr'f3 ordcr were 
thwarted by the announcement that t~:9 BasotMs had gone to the 
Ila~ive married quarter.; and tha 'tlh01e crc\;d mO'Jod off in that 
direction. The upheaval only ended once the po'lice had srrived. 
With their help the induna was able to convince the Shangctnes to 
return to the compound. They refused to go to their rooms 
however, saying that the Basotho would attac~ them. later that 
night Police re-inforcements l'l.rriv6d arid th8 dead anci wounded 
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were removed to hospital. 
In this case, the workers themselves indirectly expr9ssed the 
fact that ethnicity was an important part of a worker's 
consciousness on the mines. The Basothos at Oogies Compound wrote 
to the Resident Commissioner of Basotholand requesting his 
assistance in the matter. They articulated the source of the 
problem in ethnic terms and clearly indicated a sense of 
. 
belonging to a particular group; 
'We, Sons of Basutoland, greet you ... We are facing a tragedy 
here on account of your people who died in this compound 
having been killed by Shangaans PE.C.". Now chief, we are 
asking you to help us by sending one of the chiefs here in 
connection with this incident ... 38 Shangaans are arrested 
and none of us are under arrest except for those of us who 
died. This disturbance Chief is caused by an Induna from 
Zululand who hates Basuto very much. ' (68) 
It is not quite clear as to why the Basotho perceived the Zulu 
Induna as the cause of the conflict between the Basotho and the 
Shanganes but it none-the-less demonstrates the workers' concern 
with matters pertaining to ethnicity. 
The Shan ganes also demonstrated this concern. They however 
alleged that it was the Basothos that were the cause of the 
trouble as it was the Basotho that had attacked them. In court, a 
Shangane reported that'the Basuto call us women~ (69). This 
alludes to the derogatory image that various groups held of each 
other. In this instance the Basothos' characterisation was 
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founded on thetShanganes' uninhibited homosexual practices in the 
compounds. 
The court found the evidence connecting the accused with the 
offence with which they were charged so conflicting that it was 
impossible to say that their identification as participants had 
been clearly established. The accused were therefore found not 
guilty and discharged by the magistrate. 
Faction fights did not only occur between the Shanganes and the 
Basotho. On Witbank Colliery in 1950, a fight broke out between 
Bapedi and Baca labourers. The Compound Manager at the mine 
explained to the Native Commissioner that 
tIn the afternoon ... five Baca labourers forelaid a number 
of Bapedi labourers outside the compound, and they attempted 
to assault them by throwing stones at them. The Bapedi soon 
made this known in the Compound and all the Bapedi were up 
in arms against the Baca. Stones were thrown about and a 
couple of windows of the Baca rooms were shattered. The 
Compound Police boys did everything they could to stop the 
riot. .. ' (70) 
In this instance the Compound manager was able to ease the 
tensions and the disturbance, which could have ended in 
bloodshed, was contained. The Bapedi did not want to lay a charge 
against the Baca as none of them had been inJured. It was 
impossible to ascertain what had been the reason for the 8aca 
attacking the Bapedi. Again this points to the potential for 
superficial catalysts of factional violence. 
While the outcome of the faction fight on Oogles Navigation 
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Colliery resulted in fatalities and thus may appear as 
exceptional, it is none-the-less illustrative of certain aspects 
of life on a mine. Conflict on the mines cannot be portrayed as 
the consequence of antagonisms between management, its agents and 
the general workforce mediated by the existence of a moral 
economy. This analysis is both crude and reductionist. It fails 
to take into account the dynamics of the soc~al configuration of 
the workforce and the way that these internal dynamics were 
played out. The structural divisions within the workplace which 
. 
led to conflictual situations, for example between the boss-boy 
and worker underground, were underpinned and (;omplicated by 
conflicting ethnic identities which further served to divide th~ 
workforce on the mines. 
Ethnic identities were rooted both in the material realities of 
the home life of a particular group of workers, as well as in the 
insistence of management in the allocation of resources along 
ethnic lines.It has been shown that on the one hand, ethnicity 
functioned as an important mechanism of. support and solidarity 
for the workers. Ethnically based associations were important 
structures in assisting the workers to adapt to the harsh 
environment of the mines. On the other hand, the existent ethnic 
differences were exploited and fostered by management as can be 
seen by the allocation of rooms in the compounds according to 
'tribal' groups. Ethnicity served the interests of management as 
it entrenched divisions amongst workers and prevented united 
action against the prevailing conditions on the mines.It is 
the crucial combination and interaction of these two dimensions 
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of ethnicity that elucidates the patterns of ethnic mobilisation 
during strike action and faction fights on the mines. The concept 
of an ethnically divided workforce is a vital component in the 
explanation of collective action on the collieries. Without its 
inclusion, the moral economy remains a useful but analytically 
incomplete tool of analysis. 
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CHAPTER THREE: WmtEN IN WITBANK: lH~ __ lHPAC"(-'pJ~_pR01;n_"ft):u:S AND 
BEER-BREWING ON HjE COLLIERIE~--!_ 
This paper has attempted to show that although Moodie's notion of 
the moral economy is a particularly useful one, th~ at"RaS that it 
fails to encompass limits the efficacy of the ~oncept as an 
analytical tool when considering worker resistance. Without 
incorporating the. ethnic dimension of life on the mines and the 
workers' prior socialisation, the concept of tho moral economy is 
shorn to the most basic structural level and therefore lacks 
sufficient resonance and complexity. The incorporation of ethnic 
variables and personal considerations, howev~H , does not 
necessarily overcome the structuralist bias of the concept. 
Although the mine undoubtedly constituted a tot~l anv1~onment in 
which the miners were housed and fed, an analysis of resistance 
cannot remain locked within these confines. It is also of 
particular importance to take into account the t"elatianship 
between the mine's social microcosm and the broader nexus of 
social relations which, although they operate outside the mine 
property, have an impact upon the lives of the Iwrker-s. 
The failure to penetrate aspects of the broader s~cial setting 
and the total isolation of workers within the contnxt of the mine 
world they inhabited, is a flaw comrnon to studies of workers' 
resistance and disturbances on the mines. Causal explanations of 
stri ke act ion Find the concomitant breakdm-/n of U1e 110chani sms of 
social control seldom include variables outside the moine. The 
central hypothesis of this chapter, however, is that the moral 
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economy of the mines and the strike action that took place during 
the period under investigation, was integrally related to the 
presence and activities of women who entered the Witbank District 
from the early 1920s and who established brothels and shebeens 
around the mining properties. 
The importance of the activities of these women can only be fully 
appreciated if ore takes into account the day-to-day social 
milieu of tIle miner's world. contract labour and mechanisms of 
social control on the mines - single-sex hostels, and the rigid 
regulation of working hours and leisure-time activities, amongst 
other things, actively destroyed the possibility of "normal" 
sexual relations occurring between men and women. Moreover, 
traditional familial networks were difficult to maintain 
considering the fact that the majority of workers were migrants. 
The warped social fabric of mine life facilitated and ensured 
that prostitutes and liquor were common outlets for miners' 
frustrations. Unless these components of mine 1 ife are 
recognised, the nature of an entire mining sub-culture remains 
veiled and resistance on the mines can only be partially 
understood. 
This chapter looks at the broader social nexus that composed a 
miner's life and points to the relationships between women, and 
the breakdown of social control on the mines. The decades of the 
1920s and 1930s provide a necessary backdrop for an understanding 
of the origins and social composition of the irregular 
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settlements that sprang up on the farms surrounding the Witbank 
collieries. The first section of this chapter, therefore, deals 
with the arrival of women in the district of Witbank during the 
1920s and 1930s. This is followed by a close investigation of the 
role played by women during the decade of the 1940s. Finally the 
responses of government authorities and mine management to these 
irregular settlements are examined. 
There are three p~ints to be borne in mind when reading this 
chapter. Firstly, while there is extensive evidence of 
beer-brewing and prostitution in the Witbank Municipal Location, 
the location did not appear to have a significant impact on the 
lives of the miners. The history and activities of women in the 
location is therefore not included in this study. The focus of 
this study is rather the nature of the interaction between the 
miners and the women on the farms surrounding the mine property. 
These farms were either privately owned or they belonged to the 
mines themselves. 
Secondly, it should be remembered throughout that women cannot be 
treated as an undifferentiated or homogeneous grouping. During 
the twenties, the most obvious factor differentiating the women 
in Witbank was that the majority belonged to a distinct ethnic 
category. In the 1930s and 1940s however, the precise origins and 
social backgrounds of the women become more blurred and are 
difficult to ascertain from official sources or interviews. This 
has led to shortcomings in the present analysis, which could 
probably be rectified through more extensive oral research. 
117 
Thirdly, hard statistical data on the precise number of women in 
the Witbank area was difficult to obtain. It was none-the-less 
possible to infer, from the type of references made to these 
women and from the f~w figures available in the records, 
information regarding their presence in Witbank and their impact 
on the mines. 
A) THE ARRIVAL OF WOMEN IN THE ~ITBANK DISTRICT 
Official sources reveal that in the 1920s the presence of a large 
number of women, predominantly from Mozambique, was a pressing 
concern for the government. The presence and activities of these 
women were documented in a file entitled "The problem of 
undesirable Native Females from the Portuguese Territory" (1) 
Geographic variables necessitated that women comlng to the Rand 
from Portuguese Territories passed through the Witbank and 
Breyten Districts. It appears that many of the 'fIomen decided to 
stay in these areas with the result that Witbank and Breyten 
became the largest centres of Portuguese women in the Union. The 
nominal borders that existed between Mozambique and south Africa 
meant that large numbers of women were successful in entering the 
Union. People simply crossed over from one country to the other. 
There is also evidence that an informal organisation deveioped in 
Delagoa Bay, with the explicit intention of aiding women to cross 
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over from the Portuguese Territory to the Transvaal. A certain 
Longone and his accomplices undertook to bring women to the 
Transvaal if they paid him three pounds. He was mentioned 
repeatedly in South African Police testimonies of prohibited 
immigrants who had entered the Union surreptitiously (2). 
In the eyes of the officials these women were a source of moral 
turpitude; they came 'to take up with native men on the mines or 
on the farms wher~ there were a number of natives employed, with 
the object of prostitution and the brewing and selling of Kaffir 
beer and other liquor' (3). The women who participated in these 
"unlawful and immoral practices" were further characterised in 
highly pejorative terms. They were seen as being "of the lowest 
type", the "worst characters" (4) and were 1ater labelled in the 
press as the "Skokiaan Queens" (5). The Portuguese Curator's 
account of these women indicates just how ser"ious a problem the 
women were considered to be: 
'In spite of the fact that my Government having always 
refused permission to any women to proceed to the Union, 
hundreds of them are found in the Transvaal 1 iVing publicly 
on the proceeds of prostitution among the natives working on 
the mines', (6) 
The Curator saw the results of this as the 
, , , ,a 1 armi ng 
natives on 
threatening 
terri tory' , 
spread of veneral disease among the 
the Rand to such an extent that it 
the whole population of the 
(7) 
Portuguese 
is actually 
Mozambique 
The official, crude, vilification of these women as "low and 
immoral" was typical of a government which refused to see the 
social implications of its own policies. Recent South African 
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historiography has emphasised (8) that the arrival of women on 
the Rand was partially the result of the migrant labour system 
which divided up families for months on end and created untold 
insecurities for those left behind by the migrant. Many married 
women arrived in Witbank in the hope of recreating a settled 
family life. The testimony of an illegal male immigrant from 
Mozambique confirms this view. He stated that the women he had 
travelled with to the Union had informed him that 'they were 
coming to their men who were working in the Transvaal' (9). 
Esther Muyanga's own testimony of why she entered the Union, 
clearly demonstrates that women did not necessari Iy enter the 
Union with the intention of becoming prostitutes or beer 
brewers: 
'I had come into the Transvaal in search of my late 
husband's people as I had married a Baca native at 
Witbank ... he died there, after which I had gone to my 
Portuguese home territory on a visit'. (10) 
There were a host of other reasons why women may have entered the 
Witbank district. A significant number of women were propelled to 
Witbank because of the conditions in their homes. Rural 
pauperisation forced women off the land and they came to Witbank 
in the hope of finding alternative sources of income. Another 
category of women included those who were attempting to escape 
the demands of rural households or who had been widowed or 
deserted by their husbands. 
Irrespective of their reasons for coming to Witbank, the women 
that arrived there were both destitute and desperate for 
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employment and were forced into a bitter sti'uggle for survival. 
That women carved out beer-selling and prostitution as their own 
economic domains was a poignant indication of their plight. These 
occupations guaranteed an income in an alien working environment 
where "legal" jobs were hard to come by. A miner's reply as to 
why he thought the women were engaged in the occupations of beer-
brewing and prostitution vindicated the economic imperatives of 
these occupations: 
'It was a money makirlg system at the time. Others were 
married, others were single, but the majority were single 
and needed money ... '. (11) 
Elaborating on the choice of beer-brewing as an occupation 
precipitated by economic imperatives amongst women in the Natal 
region in the 1930s, Bradford asserted that: 
'Illegal though it was, beer-selling was one of the few 
domains in which unskilled females pouring ·into the towns 
could earn a living. It ... a110wed them to combine domestic 
duties and home industry and to escape oppressive, poorly 
paid work for whites'. (12) 
Bonner echoes this point in reference to women in Durban and on 
most of the Rand: 
' ... since virtually every avenue of wage labour ... was closed 
off to black women, the brewing of beer was one of the few 
alternative income generating strategies that they could 
employ'. (13) 
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For the lucky ones, beer-bre\'ling became more than simply a means 
of survival as it proved a highly lucrative occupation and 
provided the basis for these women's economic autonomy. In the 
main, however, it simply enabled women to eke out a living. 
It is not surprising, given the overwhelmingly male workforce on 
the collieries, that prostitution was a further- "profession" 
which allowed these women to earn an income. 'Chronically 
destitute women who had fled to these areas ... , who were blocked 
off from the labou,r market, and whose menfolk were denied family 
wages, were understandably tempted to turn their own bodies and 
time into commodities' (14). The growth of prostitution as a 
"profession" was not unique to the Witbank district. A "veritable 
sexual revolution" occurred in towns across the Rand from the 
1920s onward. In Witbank as elsewhere, the "flesh markets" 
(15) expanded with the increasing rate of proletarianisation of 
single males. The concentration of a large number of migrant 
colliers living in compounds on the mines provided a ready-made 
and profitable market for these prostitutes. Thus wom~ in 
Esther's position, namely as widowed or single females, entered 
into occupations of prostitution and liquor-brewing as a means of 
survival. 
The women arriving in Witbank congregated inside the compounds of 
the mines as well as on the farms surrounding the mines. Although 
no definite figures were given, reports indicated groups of up to 
60 women congregating on the property of an individual colliery 
(16). A small percentage of these women who were the wives of 
miners and obtained resident permits authori~ing tiiern Lo live in 
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mine married quarters. The Native Labour Act of 1915 (tne first 
Act was passed in 1908) restricted the maximum number of the 
black labour force that could be housed in the married quarters 
on any mine to four per cent of the total labour force on that 
mine, or a hundred labourers, whichever was the lower. The Act 
arose out of the government's conventional wisdom that the 
cheapest form of labour was the single migrant who returned 
after his contract was completed. The development 
permanently proletarianised workforce was to be avoided at 
home 
of a 
all 
costs. As Verwoerd would later explain, its intention was Ito 
avoid the formation of black spots at Mines and Works'. 17 The 
Act thus ensured that it was a very small group of people who 
created a settled, stable and "conventional" famiiy life on the 
mines. In almost all cases it was the more skilled, non-
contractual workers who were accommodated in the married 
quarters. These included the indunas, certain of the boss boys, 
clerks, ambulance drivers and hospital staff. The majority of 
miners were thus housed in single sex hostels. 
The Act ultimately proved counterproductive. While supposedly 
curtailing the problem of the development of a permanent black 
workforce, it created a second problem, that of uncontrolled 
women living in or near the mine locations. The Act meant that 
the greatest proportion of women arriving in Witbank were 
formally precluded from obtaining official sanction of mining 
officials for living on their property. This resulted in the 
legitimate wives of miners who were not allowed to live in the 
married quarters squatting on property adjacent to the mines so 
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as to remain in close proximity to their husbands. They were 
joined by a great many women who did not have husbands on the 
mines. Miners often preferred to iive with their wives~ under 
highly insalubrious conditions, than in the mine compounds. The 
Director of Native Labour recognised the double-edged nature of 
the Act. In his opinion, while the the application of the 
regulation prevented a family life from developing on the mines 
it also resulted in: 
• ... numbers of loose women squatting in variuus parts of the 
District under no control and who were ordinarily engaged in 
liquor selling and other immoral practices. The great 
majority of these women are from Portuguese East Africa'. 
(18) 
According to all other official reports, the areas where the 
women gathered became notorious centres of beer-brewing and 
prostitution. On Sundays, black colliers would descend on farms 
adjacent to the collieries in search of beer and women. Matyleng, 
an unauthorised Location, developed on the farm Blesboklaagte and 
was frequented by temporarily wifeless or unmarrled male 
labourers. In the opinion of a worker on Landau Colliery in the 
1940s, women that were staying on the nearby farms were there to 
sell liquor "as well as everything": 
'They (the colliers) would go there with money - you tell 
them what you're looking for and that's what you get. 
Whatever you want was available'. (19) 
Perhaps inevitably, these areas became the natural setting for 
crime and internecine fighting amongst the workers, often 
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resulting in stabbings and even deaths. The machismo culture that 
operated, together with the practices of prostitution and beer-
brewing, led to the areas being characterised as "hotbeds of 
vice". Police attempts to intervene in the situation were often 
unsuccessful. During raids at the collieries, the women would 
relocate on the farms and vice versa. When the police visited 
Matyleng, on the farm Blesboklaagte, to collect twenty five 
Portuguese women" they found the place deserted and were told 
that the women had gone to the Douglas Colliery Location. Their 
subsequent arrival at Douglas Colliery and their arrest of the 
women led to a strike at the colliery. They refused to return to 
work without their women. In general, police raids generated 
enormous resentment by black miners. They were opposed to the 
police's invasion of privacy and the harassment of their women. 
These supposedly "reprobate" women were clearly a source of major 
consternation for the Union Government, the Government of the 
Province of Mozambique and the mine owners in the 1920s. Their 
anxiety was expressed in a number of different ways. The Native 
Commissioner saw the problem as one in which 'our own natives 
take up with these women and squander their earnings on them, and 
thus fall into arrears with their taxes and neglect to provide 
for their own families' (20). Mine owners saw the women as 
converting labourers into idle classes. The more general 
contentions of white capitalists applied equallY to Witbank. In 
their eyes, 'unrestricted access to alcoholic concoctions and 
promiscous women decreased the intensity 
black labour' (21). Management stated that 
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and productivity of 
the workers would 
often return to the compounds in inebriated states and this would 
result in fighting or casualties in the workplace (22). From the 
perspective of the Witbank police, the women increased the work 
of the force, as disturbances, assaults and traffic in illicit 
liquor trade increased tenfold. (23) 
Although the different official groupings agreed that women and 
the related problems of beer-brewing and prostitution were 
inimical to their interests, tensions arose amongst the principal 
actors as to what was to be done with these women. Rather than 
arresting and deporting those who had been convicted of illicit 
liquor selling or immoral practices, the Secretary for the 
Interior, for example, proposed the indiscriminate arrest of all 
Portuguese "Native" women in Witbank. According to the Secretary, 
these "Portuguese Native females" were in all cases "11legal and 
prohibited" and he saw not the least difficulty in deporting the 
entire group. The Native Sub-Commissioner, speaking of the women 
living at the collieries, likewise saw it as desirable to deport 
as many of the women as possible in one group. tIf these women 
are not dealt with at one and the same time', he argued, tit will 
mean that those who are left out will scatter allover the 
district and be most difficult to collect again' (24). The 
Portuguese Curator was equally anxious to summarily arrest the 
women and declare them 'prohibited immigrants in one batch' (25). 
However, the Principal Immigration Officer believed in a more 
discriminating policy, suggesting that cases be submitted to him 
for consideration with a report showing why de~ortation was 
desirable. He suggested that tin a matter like this we should 
proceed cautiously and deport these people in small batches - the 
worst characters to be dealt with first'. He believed that the 
Portuguese Government were trying to use his Department to force 
the women to return so that their territory was not steadily 
denuded of its population. The real fear appeared to be that the 
wholesale repatriation of women would evoke a public scandal. 
The Town Clerk and Town Engineer of Witbank likewise expressed 
their disapproval of the Gover"nment's suggested policy of the 
wholesale deportation of the Portuguese Native females from the 
Witbank area. Albeit through a racist rationality, they expressed 
the opinion that women should be given the opportunity of staying 
with their partners in Witbank: 
• ... unless the Portuguese male native working on the mines 
in the district were allowed to have their women here there 
was a danger of the black peril cases arising. These natives 
did not, as a rule, fer tribal and other reasons, associate 
with the Transvaal women and the opinion was expressed that 
it would be better if they could have a natural outlet for 
their sexual desires'. (26) 
As a measure of control, they advocated that those women who 
remained in Witbank be compelled to live under proper supervision 
and that they should be subjected to medical examinations and 
carry permits. In cases where this did not happen, it was 
suggested that these women be deported. 
outside official circles there was another groupin3 of people who 
were anxious to secure the removal of the women back to the 
Portuguese Territory. This grouping was "The Native Cooperative 
Society of East Africa", comprised of Mozambiquen migrants to the 
Rand. As early as 1921, they were complaining of 'the continued 
presence of 2 000 Mozambiquen women at Barberton, Breyton, 
Witbank, the Witwatersrand, Klerksdorp and Bloemshof' 27 They 
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pushed for the forced repatriation of these women. It is 
important at this point to make a short excursus to investigate 
why it was in the men's interests for their women to be returned 
to Mozambique. This discussion takes the form uf a more general 
look at migrant workers' relationship to women. 
The influx of women to the urban areas caused the steady erosion 
of the customary institutions that had previously governed the 
relations between the sexes. In terms of the balance of power 
these customary institutions were almost always more advantageous 
to men. In traditional society, women were systematically 
subordinated under male domination through a series of "laws" and 
practices. It was difficult for men, however, to exercise the 
same degree of control over women once the women had left their 
traditional homesteads and had entered the urban areas. 
This loss of control by men over their womenfolk was clearly 
experienced by the migrants living on the collieries. In most 
cases the women lived separately on properties adjacent to the 
collieries. Moreover, these women were engaged in occupations 
over which men had little or no control. Women had access to 
forms of power that had previously been denied to them. Ethnicity 
therefore appealed strongly to African men 
'because it aided them in bringing a measure of control to 
the difficult situations in which they found themselves in 
their day-to-day life ... lt was the element of control 
embedded in tribal ideologies that especially appealed to 
migrant workers, removed from their land and families and 
working in far distant places'. 28 
The migrants' compiaints of the "breach of tradition" by their 
womenfolk indicated their desire to reassert their dominance over 
these women. Their neo-traditionalist ideology was an elaborate 
mask for the men's paternalistic ethic. 
Thus the Mozambiquen men's appeal to the authorities to 
repatriate the women to Mozambique, was essentially an appeal to 
the government to assist them in restoring women to their 
"customary" positions. The migrants' overture to the government 
was not an atypical gesture. Ranger, in an artlcle on tradition 
in colonial Africa, refers to this practice as the "use of 
'tradition' by men against women" (29) and he cites several 
examples throughout Africa of men appealing to the colonial 
authority to enforce "custom" upon women (30). 
There were also economic imperatives underpinning the men's 
appeal for women to be restored to their former statuses. The 
absence of most men in the countryside due to migrant labour 
meant that women played an increasingly important role in the 
day-to-day survival of the rural areas. The exodus of women to 
Witbank and other areas of the Rand signalled a breakdown in 
rural production. Ethnicity strongly appealed to men because it 
provided them with the means of control through which they could 
lessen their anxieties about events at home. Ethniclty's appeal 
to men may thus be interpreted as a tform of popular male 
resistance to the forces that were reshaping African lives ... lt 
was for this reason that the appeal of ethnic ideologies was 
strongest amongst those who were migrant labourers' 31. 
This interpretation explains why the Mozambiquen men's interests 
concerning women coincided with the interests of the local 
authorities and why both groupings, albeit for different reasons, 
fought for their repatriation. We will now return to the 
government's attempts to deal with the large presence of these 
women in the Witbank district. 
The authorities ultimately agreed on a piecemeal system of 
repatriation, with twenty five being the accepted number of women 
to be repatriated weekly. tThe material from which the batches 
of ... Portuguese women were to be drawn ... in order of selection' 
was set out as follows: 
1. Women convicted under the liquor laws 
2. unattached women. 
3. Women of known loose character. 
4. Women living with labourers known to be discharged. 
5. Women who are known to have transferred their allegiances 
to other men than their former reputed husbands. 
6. Women found in the mine locations without permits. (32) 
The Portuguese Government undertook to bear the expense of the 
railway tickets of the women repatriated and the Union Government 
undertook to provide the necessary escorts to Ressano Garcia. The 
scheme was ultimately approved by the Departments of Justice, 
Interior, Native Affairs and Commissioner of Police. The language 
used by officials in referring to the repatriation scheme is 
revealing of the Y{ay that they perceived the women. The "batches" 
of "surplus" or "loose" women were to be "cc"llected" or 
"disposed of" in order to "clean up" the distr·lct. The 
authorities were intent on "relieving" the Urban Areas of the 
"undesirable element". 
The scheme was initiated in the Witbank district in 1926. The 
details of the procedure to be followed required a huge pool of 
human resources; first the women had to be identified in terms of 
the categories outlined above. This involved a complex 
bureaucratic procedure, with the Immigration Officer having the 
final say as to whether they were prohibited immigrants. 
The women then had to be rounded up and their fingerprints had to 
be taken. They were kept overnight in the police station, and 
finally they were personally escorted into the Portuguese 
territories so as to ensure that they did not escape. By 
September 1927, the Commissioner of Police reported that 160 
women had been repatriated. Rather myopically, they perceived it 
as a victory: 
' ... 160 native females have been repatriated from the 
District with excellent results, inasmuch as it has not only 
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removed a number of loose women, but has resulted as a 
deterrent to the immigration of others and has admitted of 
greatly improved control being exercised in respect of 
locations and other places where these women habitually 
resided'. (33) 
No formal protests by women were registered in the Witbank area 
nor were there any orchestrated campaigns against their removal. 
There was a short reference to the involvement of ICU officials 
who were seen communicating with the women to b~ repatriated, but 
the women were duly removed and the ICU's efforts did not evolve 
into any formal resistance. 
These forays into the problem of women in Witbank were held up by 
the Principal Immigration Officer as a case study of success and 
it was suggested that similar arrangements be extended to all 
districts on the East Rand. However, the authorities appear to 
have overestimated the success of their campaign. In the first 
place, 160 does not appear to have been a significant proportion 
of the female population. Nine months later, thE; Dil'ector of 
Native Labour, referring to the repatriation scheme on the far 
East Rand, expressed his disappointment at the 'smallnass of the 
number repatriated' (34). He had contemplated that 'several 
hundred women from Portuguese Territory' would be returned from 
the area through this method, 'thus relieving the Urban Areas of 
this undesirable element' (35). In January 1929 the Portuguese 
Curator regretted that he had again to call the Director of 
Native Labour's 'special attention to the repatriation of the 
native women of the Colony of Mozambique' (36). Accurding to his 
report, one of the main difficulties encountered by the Union 
Authorities in sending back the womer: was that the majority of 
them claimed that they were married and that their husbands 
worked in the Witbank labour distri~t. He denied that this was a 
legitimate reason for the women to stay in the area: 
'The fact of a woman of Mozambique being attached to a man 
for the time being cannot be an obstacle of her repatriation 
If that were the case then we would never succeed to 
enforce the ~epatriation of another woman as it would be an 
easy matter for them to find husbands whenever the police 
arrived in the location'. (37) 
Article XXV of the Mozambique Convention of 1928 (38) endorsed 
the Portuguese Curator's opinion. 
Despite attempts to tighten up the repatriation scheme, the 
problem of these illegal immigrants persisted. However, the 
reports on the presence of Mozambiquan women in the Witbank 
district became scattered during the 1930s. In one of the few 
references to women, the report on Native Affairs for 1936 stated 
that there were: 
'numbers of Native employees absenting themselves from work 
or being unfit for duty particularly on Mondays as a result 
of visits to neighbouring farms, where extensive brewing of 
liquor and prostitution appear to be rife, notwithstanding 
repeated raids in the respect of the former by the police'. 
(39) 
In the light of this report as well as in the light of broader 
trends in the Union, it is likely that far from disappearing, the 
"problem" of women in the district became steadily worse. In fact 
Bonner cites the mid-30s as the beginning of a 'sustained surge 
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of black immigration to the towns which would carryon for 
another two decades' (40). From the mid-30s, women arrived in 
areas on the East Rand at an explosive rate with their numbers 
rapidly approaching those of men. The most conspicuous grouping 
amongst these new immigrants were the Basotho women. A possible 
explanation therefore, for the abrupt halt of reports concerning 
specifically Mozambiquan women, was that this grouping became 
absorbed in the broader issue of the upsurge of women on the 
Rand. Bonner suggests that this was the case: 
'By the late twenties they (Mozambiquan women), ... were 
being eclipsed if not supplanted on the Rand by other groups 
of women migrants ... These were single women from another 
adjacent territory to South Africa - that tiny land-locked 
British colony of Basutoland'. (41) 
The Basotho women attained the same labels as their Mozambiquen 
counterparts. They were identified as the 'principle source of a 
var~ety of social malaises, centering around the illicit brewing 
of beer and widespread prostitution' (42). Although Benoni and 
Nancefield were the centres where the Basuto women congregated, 
these new immigrants to the towns almost certainly filtered into 
the Witbank district. Thus the decade closed and the authorities 
had yet to find a successful way of curbing the problem of women 
on the Rand. The problem was to intensify during the war years 
and the collieries faced the issue of women on renewed, and more 
serious terms than ever before. 
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B) THE DECADE OF THE 1940's 
The influx of women on the Rand steadily increased with the 
quickening pace of black urbanisation during the 1940s and early 
1950s. Interviews confirm that there was large presence of women 
in Witbank by the early 1940s. Black miners Wh0 were employed 
on mines in the 1940s all greeted the question of women in the 
area in such an affirmative manner that there seems little 
question of their presence and fundamental impact on the 
call ieries. 
Renewed concern about "the problem of women" becomes evident in 
the Native Commissioner's reports on disturbances in the Witbank 
district in the 1940s. These documents point to certain shifts in 
the nature of the "problem" since its origins in the 1920's. The 
old terminology of the "problem of undesirable women from 
Portuguese East Africa" was now 
reference to the "problem of Native 
shift in terminology demonstrates 
replaced by the more general 
Squatters on farms". This 
two points. Firstly the 
introduction of the term "squatting" was probably a reflection of 
the proliferation of squatter movements in the 19305 and the fact 
that squatting had become a burning concern for the government by 
the 1940s. Secondly, the application of a new term indicates a 
change in the composition of the people concerned. Portuguese 
women were no longer the sole focus of the problem as they were 
joined by large numbers of women belonging to other ethnic groups 
as well as men who took to squatting with their wanenfolk. During 
the 1940s, the Department of Native Affairs began to identify the 
'classes of natives who constitute the squatters in question 
(more generally as): 
1. Natives in employment on the mines. 
2. Natives in employment in the urban areas. 
3. Natives in bona fida farm employment. 
4. Natives who form a parasite class, which battens on the 
legitimate labourers on mines and in urban areas', (43) 
In their opinion it was the last class which 'caused the most 
trouble and which is creating the difficulties of the mining 
authorities' (44) In terms of Section 6 of the Native Urban Areas 
Act of 1923, the following classes of Native males did not 
require the written approval of the Minister for them to reside 
on the farm: 
1. Bona fide employees of owner, lessee or occupier. 
2. Heads of kraals whose inhabitants are bona fide employees 
of (1) above. 
3. Labour tenants. 
The wife, minor child, unmarried daughter or bona fide dependent 
of any Native requires the Secretary for Native Affairs' permit, 
'unless such Native is exclusively employed by the owner, lessee 
or occupier of the land ... ' (45). This law was largely ignored by 
landowners in the Witbank district who allowed large numbers of 
"natives" who did fall within the above categories to congregate 
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on their land. Of major concern were the farms Blesboklaagte, 
Uitspan, Zeekoewater, Klipfontein, Groonfontein and Blaaukrans. 
On inspection of these farms in 1947, the Native Commissioner 
discovered the extent of the problem; towners of certain portions 
of the farm Blaaukrans, which is within 5 miles of the Municipal 
boundary and in close proximity to certain mine compounds, have 
permitted Natives - some 400 families - to reside on the farm on 
. 
payment of rental. The Natives are not in bona fide employ of the 
owners but have established brothels and SheLeen:;' (46). 
In Mrs.de wet's application for permission to establish a 
location on her farm Groenfontein in 1940, she stated reasons why 
people were seeking to live on the surrounding farms. She said 
that she was continually being approached by people who wanted to 
settle on her ground. It appeared that they were, 
~ ... local married natives working either on the collieries 
or in the Municipal area of Witbank, but ~ho were either 
unable to obtain accommodation in the mine married quarters 
or are unwilling to reside in the Municipal Location and ... 
are also unwilling to reside under labour tenant conditions, 
are seeking to obtain sites for hire on the farms adjoining 
the mines and Municipal boundary'. (47) 
The collieries believed that there was no shortage of 
accommodation and permission was duly refused. The situation 
worsened as the decade progressed. On Groenfontein in 1948, the 
Native Commissioner noted that there was a tcontinuous row of 
wattle and daub huts in close proximity to each other. The total 
number of huts is 117'. Only 10 of these huts were occupied by 
bona fide employees. The Commissioner calculated that a total of 
608 people - 107 men, 129 women and 372 children - were living 
illegally on the farm. 46 of the men were employed on the 
Collieries (48). 
An investigation by the Native Commissioner on housing on the 
collieries highlighted the large number of workers who were 
squatting on tha farms surrounding the collieries rather than 
living in the compounds. These figures do not include workers who 
were living in uncontrolled locations and ~era also therefore 
outside of the mine management's control. 49 
NUMBER OF 
WORKERS ON 
THE COLLIERY 
Alpha - 270 
Tweefontein - 2423 
Greenside - 1218 
Navigation - 1500 
Coronation - 893 
Oogies - 700 
Kendall - 395 
NUMBER OF 
WORKERS 
LIVING ON FARMS 
201 
96 
81 
168 
160 
80 
35 
These figures demonstrate that during the 19405 the farms played 
an important role in the life of miners and women remained a 
major node of attraction away from the uninviting world of the 
mine compounds where unhygienic and comfortless conditions 
prevailed. The integral connection between life on the mines and 
the world of the squatters in the 1940s is emphasised in a 
variety of sources. The most telling of these are the words of 
the miners themselves. In interviews, the initial response to the 
question of women was an archetypal, 'Oh ja, there were plenty', 
or 'Women, jo, too many' (50). 
Albert Simelane, remarked with gusto that the farms surrounding 
the collieries were a source of great pleasure for the miners: 
'Oh! They enjoyed themselves on these farms - women there, 
beer there, lovers there. That place used to help the people 
from the mine'. (51) 
During the faction fight at Oogies Navigation Colliery in 1945, 
the testimonies of the accused Shanganes demonsLrated how the 
farms were a major meeting place for the miners during their free 
time. Julio Mafuna testified that he remembered: 
' ... the day of the trouble at the Oogies navigation 
colliery, I was lying drunk in my room No. 10 from 3 p.m. I 
went out at 10. a.m. and returned at 3 p.m. drunk and then 
lay down. I went to the farms in the morning. When I lay 
down at 3 p.m. no one was in the rooms. All the others were 
out visiting and drinking'. (52) 
Julio's witness was Arnesto Koza who 'Jives on th@ surrounding 
farms and when he comes on duty he changes in my room' (53). 
Moseta Zungusu told the court that, 
'On the Sunday of the disturbance, I went to the farms a~ 
about midday. I came back late at night after everyone had 
gone to bed'. 54 
Shikwenta Martin and others of the accused repeatedly stated that 
they were on the farms on the Sunday in question. It is unlikely 
that they used their visits to the farms as a convenient alibi. 
The farms were an integral part of the miners' lives and they 
spent many hours of their free time partaking in the activities 
on the farms. 
In 1947, the Fagan Commission likew"lse pointed to the link 
between the mines and the squatting communities. The Commission 
used the practice& of East Coast workers on the collieries as a 
way of proving that 'the boy with his family is a far more 
settled boy with a better sense of responsibility to the 
workforce'. According to the report, the 'East Coast boys have 
pseudo families in the huts adjoining their compound and when 
their term of service is over, they hand the women onto their 
successors' (55). This type of practice probably arose among the 
East Coasters rather than the Basotho or Pedi workers because the 
latter groupings lived closer to the mines and could return home 
more frequently. The need for a "substitute family" was thus not 
as acute. Delius noted that, 'Pedi men were encouraged by their 
elders to go home if they could no longer stand compound 
conditions. Short contracts and the relative proximity of 
Sekhukuneland to the Rand, also helped the need for homosexual 
release' (56). 
Contradictory tendencies were reflected in the evidence 
pertaining to the issue of ethnicity within the squatter camps. 
On the one hand, ethnicity appeared to be less pronounced in the 
settlements than it was on the collieries. Heterosexual 
relationships did not occur along strict ethnic lines. In 
interviews, cross-ethnic 1iasons were cited as the norm. In 
particular, ethnic divisions appeared to be virtually non-
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existent amongst the women. 
There are several conjectures why this was the case. In the 
previous section it was shown that ethnicity was an important 
means through which men could assert their control over women. 
For women, however, there was less reason to uphold their ethnic 
identities. The loss of these identities implied a greater 
freedom and independence from patriarchal control. 
Moreover, women did not have to appeal to their ethnicity because 
of any attachments to the land. Unlike migrant workers who 
returned home once they completed their contracts, most women had 
completely ruptured their relationship to the rural world. There 
were no contracts compelling these women to return home for a 
specified period of time. For the migrants, however, access to 
cattle, land and women remained fundamentally important and were 
the underpinnings of their etllnic consciousness and identity. 
'Even rural areas that were little more than unproductive 
rural slums necessarily remained of central concern for the 
migrants ... It was in the rural areas that the workers' long 
term interests lay'. (57) 
This, however, was not true for women in the urban areas. There 
was a general sense of the remoteness of or lack of concern with 
their rural past. Issues such as cattle and land no longer formed 
an important part of their consciousness. Thus women's severence 
from their homes weakened the basis of their ethnic identities. 
'Ethnicity's appeal was strongest for men, then, and the Tswana 
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proverb to the effect that "women have no tribe" had a real - if 
unintended - element of truth in it'. (58) 
Unlike on the collieries where ethnic identities were reinforced 
by institutional divides on the part of the management, as show 
in Chapter 2, there were no forms of imposed ethnic divisions on 
the farms. That ethnic identities did not manifest to the same 
degree amongst women on the farms, bears out the point that it 
was the crucial combination of the migrants' own sense of ethnic 
identities and the manipulation of these identities by management 
that led to ethnic disharmony. 
A further conjecture of why there was less ethnic association 
among women is that on the farms the women lived in smaller 
groupings and were forced to form cohesive units that 
transcended ethnic barriers. As marginalised and alienated 
individuals they had less choice in whom they associated with. 
It is interesting to note that in this period there is no 
evidence that the men attempted to repatriate the women as the 
Mozambiquens had done in the 1920's. 
The lack of ethnic forces operating among women appears to be the 
general situation in the settlements. There is evidence to the 
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contrary, however, which suggests that ethnic distinctions were 
in fact existent among the women. Moreover, despite the apparent 
lack of concern in the squatter camps over questions of ethnicity 
in relationships, women were in fact a major source of ethnic 
tensions and conflict amongst men. An interviewee recalled that 
'the Basotho women could always be identified ... and there 
were lots of fights over these women, especially the 
Bashes!.--,"'8 from Basutoland fighting over these women. The 
Basuto men became very aggressive ... because they did not 
want any other tribe or nation to go near their women. Their 
women were exclusive'. (59) 
It seemed that a type of ritual developed among the Marashea when 
a new woman arrived on a farm. The Marasheas would go and visit 
the woman. If they found her with another man who was not a 
Basheshwe, 'they'd escort these women underarms with kirris, (off 
the farm). If you're the man whose not a Bashash~a, ... and you 
don't run away, then you're dead' (60). There 3eemed to be a 
tacit rule operating that if a miner were a Pedi or Shangane, he 
stayed away from Basotho women unless he were prepared to risk 
his life. This is example of one type of informal rule operating 
in the squatting camps which was likely to lead to friction or 
fighting among the colliers. It seems likely there were a series 
of such rules which, if they were broken, would trigger off 
conflict among workers. In general, where ethnic tensions did 
exist on the farms, as in the above example with the Marashea, 
they were generally the product of the males' attitude rather 
than those of the females'. 
143 
There is little doubt that the mines were affected by the "goings 
on" in the squatter camps. A Mine Manager drew a very clear 
relationship between activities on the farm and life on the 
mines: 
tI still don't really know why the farmers accepted them. 
Possibly th~ farmers were getting a kick-back - but that is 
generally where the problems started ... if anything happened 
in the shebeens it would spillover onto the mines'. 61 
Albert Simelane described how this "spilling over" would occur: 
tIssues in the squatting camps were brought on the mines. 
(In the squatter camps), they (the miners) were fighting 
especially on the weekends - they get drunk then they fight. 
That man would go for another man's wife and then you would 
see that man chasing that other man. That matter will come 
to the compound during the week. You'll see Monday, a 
certain man will say he saw such and such a man from room 
number three with his wife. He's making a case. The man is 
reporting to the Induna and the Induna is taking it to the 
Compound Manager'. (62) 
In genelal, the response of the Compound Manager was to shrug off 
responsibility for the occurrence. He would tell the worker to go 
to the police station and report the incident. The following 
statement made by a Compound Manager clearly demonstrates this 
attitude: 
tGo to the charge office or the Native Commissioner and the 
police will come and get this man if there's a case but I'm 
not dealing with the case'. (63) 
Albert Simelane maintained that there were many cases like this. 
The Compound Manager's refusal to get involved in these cases 
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resulted in the workers attempting to deal with them in their own 
ways. It is unlikely that the workers voluntarily went to the 
police to try and solve the issue. This provides a possible 
explanation of the link between women in the squatter camps and 
the ethnic rivalry and factiol) fights on the collieries. Attempts 
to resolve the fighting that occurred in the squatters camps 
between colliers. assumed an ethnic character once the conflict 
was brought back onto the mines. The involved workers would seek 
support from members of their own ethnic grouping in order to 
take revenge on the guilty party. The latent tensions among the 
different ethnic groups that were spoken about in Chapter 2 
possibly had their source in the activities and occurrences 
amongst workers in the squatter camps. 
Far from making a contribution to the growth of a more 
generalised working class culture, cross-ethnic liasons or 
marriages on the farms exacerbated ethnic divisions. Tho ethnic 
particularist forces operating in the compounds, which stood in 
stark contrast to cross-ethnic flavour of the activities on the 
farms, appeared to be the stronger force in determining miners' 
identities. They overshadowed and obscured the "ethnic mixing" 
that occurred on the farms. This makes one wonder however, the 
extent to which the attitude of management and structural factors 
of compound life was responsible for the ethnic particularism 
operating on the mines. The lack of an ethnic consciousness when 
men fraternised with women, would certainly point to the major 
impact of institutionalised divisions on ethnic identities. 
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C) THE RESPONSES OF THE AUTHOHITIES TO SQUATTING 
The documents sU'9gest that the "squatting issue" became the 
concern of a broad sector of the Witbank community, ranging from 
local officialdom to mine owners, to the local farmers. 
In 1939, Witbank's Magistrate wrote to the Secretary of Native 
Affairs, alerting him to the situation: 
'Round all the mine properties are congregated collections 
of native huts, occupied mostly by native women whose only 
reason for being there, is the brewing of skokiaan and other 
noxious liquids which they sell to the mine labourers. 
Constant police raids and sentences seem to be unavailing, 
as fast as these people are got rid of others take their 
place'. (64) 
These people were considered to be a "constant source of 
trouble", and " it would be a blessing if these natives could be 
got rid f" o . He thereby requested that the Seer'etary for Native 
Affairs take some administrative steps to "clean things up " and 
get rid of the "loafers" who were in 5 mile radius of the 
Municipal boundary. No such action was forthcoming. 
The Secretary for Public Health believed the squatters were a 
'serious menace to public health'. Most of the dwellings lacked 
any provision in respect of sanitation and water supply (65). In 
1941, the Senior Health Officer pointed to the absurdity of 
employers taking precautions against the r~cent outbreak of 
smallpox amongst their employees, when the Government allows the 
'indiscriminate squatting of Natives outside the boundaries of 
the industries, with no water supplies, no sanitation and almost 
. 
uncontrolled beer and liquor selling and prostitution to go 
unchecked'. He reckoned that approximately 500 families were 
involved in these activities and that all cases of smallpox were 
as a result of this type of dwelling. Instead of the situation 
improving, the Secretary for Public Health noted in 1942, that 
'the insanitary conditions in the neighbourhood of the several 
collieries in the Witbank area have steadily deteriorated with 
the efflux of time' (66). He pinpointed the reasons for the 
deterioration, as stemming from the Municipality's insistence 
that several of the troubled areas lay outside of its boundaries 
of the municipality and that they were therefore not subject to 
its jurisdiction. The Town Council urged that the inclusion of 
Blesboklaagte, Uitspan and Zeekoewater which were out.side the 
five mile urban boundary, be 'held over until the end of the 
present war' (67) . This was a polite way of shirking 
responsibilities for the appalling conditions that prevailed in 
these areas. 
The Mine Managements were often Janus-faced in their dealings 
with the issue of liquor, prostitution and the squatting 
communities on the surrounding properties. Their responses were 
clearly not governed by any moral imperatives but were rather 
governed by the dictates of production schedules and 
profitability. Within the latter framework they were able to see 
both the benefits and the perils of a squatter community on the 
fringes of mining property. On the one hand, liquor and 
prostitution provided useful outlets for a workforce that were 
engaged in hard manual labour and that lived under unnatural 
conditions in single sex hostels for six days a week. On the 
. 
other hand, the practices of beer-brewing and prostitution were 
the source of major conflict amongst the miners and tensions 
spilled over into life on the mines and created disturbances. A 
Mine Manager in the 40's was predisposed towards believing that 
the faction fights stemmed from incidents outside of the work 
situation and were connected directly with the presence of women 
and beer-brewing in the surrounding areas. He aptly summed up the 
dual role played by women. He recognised their value in that, 
tIt was rather difficult when you have a thousand virile 
males on the collieries and some of them were literally 
locked up at night so that they were at work on time the 
next day ... but you couldn't lock them up on the 
weekend ... Generally on the fringes (of the collieries) were 
the Shebeen Queens with their brothels (where these men 
went)'. (68) 
At the same time it was there that 'the problems on the mines 
started' (69). certain events on the mines were directly 
attributed to the presence and activities of women. 
On Minaar Colliery, the management were experiencing the adverse 
effects of their workers visiting the surrounding farms. In an 
interview, Elijah Shangwe explained that the police would arrest 
workers from Minaar Colliery when they were raiding the shebeens 
and brothels on the surrounding farms. The people were then taken 
to Oogies police station and their jobs on the collieries were 
not done. These type of interferences obviously hampered 
production. Management on Minaar Colliery developed an 
interesting tactic in an attempt to take control of the 
activities of beer-brewing and prostitution. Elijah revealed the 
following actions taken by the management: 
'In the married quarters at Minaar Colliery, the Compound 
Manager gave the rules that during w~ekends the women they 
(sic) should brew African beer - "umquomthi" for the 
people from the compounds so that they shou"ld have 
strength ... That was the regulation. This discouraged miners 
from going to the farms whsre they would drink unhealthy 
liquor. Women from the farms used to sell liquor that is 
very strong, called "quick mix" - it made people get drunk 
very quickly. They made a concoction of many things'. (70) 
This "regulation" essentially gave workers a license to drink -
but it was preferable for management that the workers drank beer 
brewed on their premises and under their contr:>l. The management 
made a deal with the Oogies police to ensure that brewing could 
take place in the married quarters w'ithout interference; 
'Police from Oogies were told not to arrest these women 
brewing and drinking in the mine married quarters'. (71) 
Worker's perceptions of the response of Mine M3nag8ment to women 
on the neighbouring farms, was that they generally "turned a 
blind eye" to their activities. The following metaphor, 
demonstrates great acumen into the management's attitude towards 
his workforce; 
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'He was happy because his cows were able to graze there. 
There was grass that they could eat rather than sitting in 
the compound ... If your cows are grazing in greener pasture, 
you don't worry. As long as they were working, he was not 
against this type of thing. The Compound Manager was not 
bothered by that type of life'. (72) 
Thus it can be assumed that the management were only outspoken 
in their opposition to the squatters on surrounding farms and 
, 
against the lawlessness that result~d from the activities, if it 
L~_?ulted in a lo?s of produQtiolh They had no moral qualms 
against liquor and its concomitant "evils" and were quite happy 
to allow their workers to go to the surrounding farms. 
On mines where production was affected, the Mine Managements 
endeavoured to ease the squatting problem by extending the 
provisions that they had made for married quarters on their 
property, so that married mine employees would return to the 
mines. They ultimately had their hands tied however, a5 they were 
still bound by the Act that restricted the lJercentage of the 
labour force that could be housed in the married quarters. 
Farmers on the whole were reluctant to evict the squatters. 
A possible explanation of their reluctance, was that the 
squatters worked for the farmer during the harvest~ng season or 
paid him rent for their properties and thus wefe an additional 
source of income. The Magistrate saw it as a 'kllul-ln fact that 
he (the farmer) makes an income out of them by charging them for 
the privilege of living there'. In 1948, the Native Commissioner 
ascertained that 'this practice of permitting natives to squat on 
farms, on payment of a monthly rental, has been in vogue for a 
number of years' (73). Speaking about Mrs.de Wet on the farm 
Groenfontein, he believed that she found the letting of ground 
to the "natives" so lucrative that she allowed the numbers of 
squatters to increase considerably. 'The near proximity of the 
compounds, with the opportunities offered in the way of liquor 
selling and prostitution, made the situation very attractive to 
. 
the Natives' (74). Not all farmers supported squatting 
arrangements however. When Mr. Loubser took over Groenfontein 
from Mrs. de Wet in 1948, he appealed for the immediate 
assistance of the police to remove the large squatting community 
that had developed. For Mr. Loubser, the fact that squatters were 
stealing his crops, that their cattle were grazing in his 
pastures, and that there were bad feelings between him and the 
squatters, outweighed any pecuniary benefits that resulted from 
allowing the squatters to stay on his farm. 
Mr. J.F. Schoombee, owner of the farm Blesboklaagte, ironically 
spoke out against the practice of farmers al10wing squatting, 
while he was defending himself against the government's 
accusation that he was illegally harbouring squatters. He told 
the Commissioner that' in (sy) geval is die yolk almal 'Bona 
Fide' Woonkaffers, of Plakkers. Dit is egter meer as wat kan gese 
word vir die mense am die dorp. Ek is die enigste "Boer" in die 
regte die woord om die dorp (75). This implied that the other 
farmers were not "real". 
The "symbiotic" nature of the r"elationship that developed between 
some farmers and the squatter communities, created impediments 
for the police in their attempts to remove the squatters. 
Repeatedly, the Magistrate was informed that prosecutions had 
failed because the police were unable to secure the necessary 
evidence against the squatters concerned: 
'Any investigations by the Police as to the legality of 
natives' presence on ground are met by an alleged contract 
between the' farmer and the native head of the family under 
which the latter acquires the right to live on the farm with 
his wife and family in return for the services to the 
landowner of three months each year of a member of the 
f am 11 y.' ( 76) 
It was well known that these contracts were not bona fide - the 
workers paid a ~onthly rental for the ground, with a probable 
amount of "goodwill" for the illegal brewing. However, it was a 
bureaucratic nightmare for the government to prove that squatters 
on the farms were not in the bona fide employment of the farmer. 
'Owing to collusion between the farm owner and the so called 
tenants, it has been found practically impossible for the 
police to obtain the proof, (that the family pays rent to 
the landowner) necessary for successful prosecution'. (77) 
The Magistrate later elaborated on the nature of the contract 
between the landowner and squatter; 
In practice what happens is that an able bodied native 
with a number of female dependents enters into a collusive 
contract with a landowner binding himself or his sUbstitute 
to render farm labour for 90 days, in return for the right 
to live on the land. A small youth boy then ostensibly 
performs the 90 days service, leaving the head of the 
family free to loaf or work elsewhere where he chooses, 
while the rest of the family take up their abode as near to 
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the ~lunicipal Location or a mine compound as they can, and 
there brew liquor to their hearts' content'. (78) 
The Magistrate advocated the wholesale eradication of the 
clusters of squatters around every mine property. An alternative 
route to prosecution was to charge 
• 
the farmers in terms of 
Section 5 of the ~ative Land Act of 1913. 
Ironically, the government was partially responsible for the 
continued existence: of squatting communities. Tne Magistrate of 
Witbank made repeated appeals to the government for Chapter 4 of 
the Native Land and Trust Act of 1936 to be made applicable to 
the proclaimed labour area of Witbank (79). This Act specifically 
controlled the number of labour tenants on farm property. 
According to the Magistrate, the government's refusal to enforce 
this Act, meant that, 'the existing state of affairs cannot be 
effectively cured by criminal procedures' (80). This was borne 
out by the thwarted attempts made by the officials to deal with 
the problem. 
It is most likely that the Government's refusal to enforce this 
Act was related to its attempt to protect the precarious 
positions of Local Authorities in the period. The massive influx 
of people into the municipal areas created an endless housing 
backlog for the Local Authorities. Speaking on the congregation 
of "natives" living under insanitary conditions in the Witbank 
District in 1942, the Secretary for Native Affairs told the 
Health Inspector that the location was already overcrowded and 
the local authority was 'doing its best to expedite its housing 
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scheme'. It would however, embarrass the Local Authority if it 
was 'at this stage faced with demands for immediate accommodation 
by natives legitimately entitled to be housed in the location' 
(81). He was openly encouraging the stalling of eviction of 
"natives" until such time as the Local Authorities would be able 
to provide them with accommodation. Improvement of sanitary 
conditions was considered the necessary step before the removal 
of the squatters took place. 
In 1947, the Fagan Commission's investigation of the urban 
native question", bore out the serious nature of the housing 
problem in Witbank's Municipal Location. The ,"epresentat1ves of 
the Fagan Commission pointed out to the Municipality that 'there 
were over 500 native families in excess of your housing 
capacity' (82). Mr. Turnball, the Town Clerk, assured them that 
his council was busy preparing plans for new location extensions 
and the establishment of a modern "Native Village". 
Thus even in cases where there was no collusion between the 
farmers and squatters, the authorities found themselves in a 
difficult position, as the housing crisis in the location 
created severe obstacles to the easy removal of squatters. All 
the squatters on the farm Groenfontein had beell convicted by the 
Magistrate in the July of 1947 in terms of Section 15(3) act No. 
25 of 1945, which imposed a penalty of fifty pounds on those 
squatters who refused to move, but more than half of them had 
failed to move by January the next year. The attorneys Basner and 
154 
Jaffe intervened on behalf of the squatters and insisted that 
the squatters would not move until such time as alternative 
accommodation had been provided for them. They reminded the Town 
Clerk that, 
~It must be readily appreciated by you that if the squatters 
are committing an offense by remaining in their present 
abodes, such an offense is a continuing one and with the 
most genuine desire in the world to comply with the law 
which they can only do by moving to s~ne other spot they 
will once again be trespassers, when the hounding out by the 
authorities concerned will again be put into operation'. 
(83) 
Without the government's allocation of lots to the squatters, the 
court was helpless in insisting that the squatters be moved. 
Another two years elapsed before Mr. Loubser's request that the 
squatters be removed from his farm actually came to fruition. 
In the minds of the officials, the squatters had no legal rights 
and they had no ground for appeal aga"inst their r~movals. In the 
Native Commissioner's mind, the 'nati~es squatting on the farms 
did not want to move until they are forced to move for the simple 
reason that they are living free of rent on the farm - they are 
not subject to any control and a good number uf them are making 
money in illicit liquor' (84). 
The nature of the interaction between colliers and women has 
revealed the importance of taking broader social issues into 
account when studying resistance on the mines. Although ethnicity 
was not always the cause of conflict that arose in the squatter 
camps, the tensions amongst men would manifest in ethnic terms 
once they had returned to the mines. These conflicts exacerbated 
the existent ethnic divisions that were a feature of mine life. 
In the 1920s, there is evidence that strik~s tCQk place over 
police interference with the colliers' women. In contrast, women 
do not appear to have been a direct cause of strike action 'in the 
19405. However, their presence on the farms surrounding the 
call ieries was a, vital feature in the 1 ives of the miners and 
they undoubtedly affected the relationships and cct"ivities Oll the 
mines. There was almost a pragmatic recognition on the part of 
the mine management of the importQnce of these Humen ;n the l'ives 
of the colliers. Their acceptance of the presen.:;e (If th;:;se women 
on the farms, however, was always contingent on the fact that 
they did not disrupt production. In many cases this appeals not 
to have been the case. 
~-------------------~ 
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18.7687, 295/332 Strike at Klipfontein Colliery 
19.7687, 307/332 Strike at Greenside Colliery 
20.7689, 327/332 Strike at Alpha Colliery 
21.7689, 338/332 Strike at Western Consolidated 
22.7690, 344/332 Strike at Tvl Navigation Mine 
23.675, W19/209 BVE SA Coal Estates 
24.9924, 523/408 South Witbank Compound 
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B. Municipal Records of Witbank, MWB 
1. 4/1/1 Correspondence Files Native Location 
2. 4/1/2 Correspondence Files Native Location 
3. 4/1/31 Location by-laws 
4. 4/1/14 Correspondence Fi les Health Committee 
C. Government Native Labour Bureau, GNLB 
1. 229, 583/15 Irregular Practices in the 
Compounds 
2. 261, 433/16 Housing and Accommodation on 
Collieries 
3. 327, 236/20 Registration of Portuguese 
Natives to Coronation Col1ierles 
4. 406, 60/1 Repatriation of Undesirable 
Portuguese Women 
5. 406, 60/2 Repatriation of Undesirable 
Portuguese \'Iomen 
6. 396, 163/26 Strike at Navigation Colliery 
7. 410, 73/6 Strike at Mi naar Co 11 i ery 
D. Secretary for Justice, JUS 
1. 368 3/10/23 Strikes at Coal Mines in Witbank 
E. TPB 
1. 182 TALG514 Witbank Native Location 1911-53 
2. 182 TALG2/514 Location Regulations 
3. 1854 TA6/14395 Land purchase from Witbank 
colliery for Native Location 
~-------~--------
F. Native Commissioner - Native Affairs Department 
(Referred to as the Native Commissioner's Reports) 
1. N1/9/2, Native Politics and Unrest, Disturbances 
in the Witbank District 
a) KWB N2/15/12 
b) KWB N1/6/2 
G. SAS 
1. 1513 TL 1658/359 Coal from Witbank 
H. Native Laws Commission of Inquiry (Fagan) (Church 
of the Province Library. University of the 
Witwatersrand) 
1. AD 1756 Ba-Bb General Evidence 
2. AD 1756 A36-48 Specific Evidence 
I. Witbank Joint Council (Chamber of Provinc8 Library, 
Universityof the Witwatersrand) 
1. AD1433 Cw-Cz Box59 
J. Annual General Reports of the Chamber of Mines 
1835-1950 (Chamber of Mines Library) 
K. Newspapers (State Library) 
1. The Guardian 
2. Witbank News 
L. Interviews 
1. Anonymous, September 
Compound Manager on the 
1960's. 
1989, Gallo Manor. 
collieries during the 
"-----~--------
2. Mac Gillivray, Roy, September 1989, Northcliff. 
Underground Manager during the 1950's 
3. Mathda Joseph, October 1989, Witbank Locsticn. 
Coal Cutter at Navigation and Landau Colliery 
during the 1940's. 
4. Simelane Albert, October 1989, Witbank Location. 
Junior Clerk at Greenside during the 1940's and 
then a Chief Induna. 
5. Dickson Peter, October 1989, Witbank Location. 
Growing up on Greenside Colliery du;"ing the 
1940's, iater a Mine Manager. 
C. Hazula Crosby, October 1989, Witbank Location. 
Coal Cutter on Phoenix Colliery durins the 
1940's. 
7. Shangwe, Elijah, October 1989, Witbank Location. 
Weigh-bridge Clerk at Minaar Colliery during the 
1940's 
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